


THE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROCOMMUNISM
FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE:
A CASE STUDY OF ITALY AND THE PCI

Darlene Weidler Vatikiotis

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

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by

Darlene Weidler Vatikiotis

March 1980

Thesis Advisor:

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for the NATO Alliance:
A Case Study of Italy and the PCI

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The rise of Communism in Western Europe in recent years poses a significant challenge to both the West and the East. This study examines aspects of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism and its effect upon the NATO Alliance; presents the differing nuances and significance of Eurocommunism; and offers an historical overview of Eurocommunism and, specifically, the Italian Communist Party (PCI). A discussion of the Alliance identifies recent important developments, the Italian contribution to NATO, and the United States' interests in the NATO Alliance. The military and defense policies of the Italian Communist Party are discussed and the likelihood of its attaining a position of power in a future government is analyzed. The results of recent elections in Italy are examined in this study, as well as alternatives to NATO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|------|---|----|
| I. | INTRODUCTION ----- | 7 |
| II. | MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROCOMMUNISM ----- | 11 |
| | A. VARIATIONS IN MEANING ----- | 11 |
| | B. GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECT ----- | 18 |
| | C. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS ----- | 24 |
| | D. INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW? ----- | 27 |
| III. | HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE PCI - | 33 |
| | A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMMUNISM ----- | 33 |
| | B. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PCI ----- | 37 |
| | C. THE POST-WAR YEARS ----- | 40 |
| | D. THE 1970'S ----- | 46 |
| IV. | THE NATO ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY --- | 52 |
| | A. THE NATO ALLIANCE ----- | 52 |
| | B. RECENT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ----- | 55 |
| | C. THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO ----- | 59 |
| | D. U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO AND ITALY ----- | 62 |
| | E. THE MILITARY AND DEFENSE POLICIES OF THE PCI - | 65 |
| V. | LIKELIHOOD OF PCI IN POWER ----- | 72 |
| | A. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ITALY ----- | 72 |
| | B. STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ----- | 77 |
| | C. THE COMMUNIST VOTER ----- | 84 |
| | D. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS - 1976 AND 1979 - | 88 |
| VI. | EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON NATO ----- | 98 |

| | | |
|----|---|----|
| A. | EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO ----- | 98 |
|----|---|----|

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| B. | ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATO ALLIANCE ----- | 111 |
|----|---|-----|

| | | |
|------|-------------------|-----|
| VII. | CONCLUSIONS ----- | 118 |
|------|-------------------|-----|

| | | |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-----|
| APPENDIX A: | MILITARY STATISTICS OF ITALY ----- | 127 |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-----|

| | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-----|
| APPENDIX B: | THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN ----- | 129 |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-----|

| | | |
|-------------|--------------------|-----|
| APPENDIX C: | MAP OF ITALY ----- | 130 |
|-------------|--------------------|-----|

| | | |
|-------------|--|-----|
| APPENDIX D: | PARTIAL LISTING OF U.S./NATO INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY ----- | 131 |
|-------------|--|-----|

| | | |
|-----------|-------|-----|
| FOOTNOTES | ----- | 132 |
|-----------|-------|-----|

| | | |
|-----------------------|-------|-----|
| SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY | ----- | 149 |
|-----------------------|-------|-----|

| | | |
|---------------------------|-------|-----|
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST | ----- | 158 |
|---------------------------|-------|-----|

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past four years, the rise of Communism in Western Europe has been of such significance as to pose a challenge to both the West and the East. Wide ranging debate has ensued both in Washington and in Moscow and much has been written on the nature and ramifications of this manifestation of West European Communism. What is Eurocommunism and how valid a threat is it to the superpowers? Is there truly a new brand of Communism, independent of the Soviet Union, professing principles of democratic pluralism while denouncing the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "dictatorship of the proletariat"? If Eurocommunism does exist - and there are journalists and scholars who strongly deny such a concept - what does this portend for the United States and the NATO Alliance?

The phenomenon of Eurocommunism, while attracting considerable attention, continues to remain ambiguous due to its geographic and political imprecision. The term carries various interpretations ranging from "mythical," "confusing," "a public relations label," to "democratic," "tolerant," and "moderate." While not defining a finite concept or coherent doctrine, Eurocommunism implies a trend or approach toward an independent, pluralistic form of socialism. It professes a respect for individual liberties and finds its roots in the democratic nations of Western Europe.

Whatever adaptation analysts employ to aid in understanding this "new" form of Communism, it is evident that a need exists to more fully comprehend this tendency in Western Europe, not only for the foreign policy makers of the United States, but also for the leaders of the Soviet Union. In the event that a member nation of the NATO Alliance should be confronted with a Communist-oriented government either in its own country or in one of the others, a potential exists for a disruption in the operations of the Alliance. For this reason as well as other supporting circumstances, it is imperative that the United States be prepared for such a happening.

This study analyzes the phenomenon of Eurocommunism and the implication that it could have for the NATO Alliance. It is the hypothesis of this study that, if the Italian Communist Party, as one of the Eurocommunist parties, were to come to power in a future government, the ramifications and effects upon the NATO Alliance would be detrimental to the United States. To test and to prove this hypothesis, various methods of analysis are employed, including descriptive-analytical discussions. To understand the overall approach, a brief discussion on each chapter is offered.

The initial section of this study addresses the various meanings and significance of Eurocommunism, presenting the diverse interpretations of the trend, and discussing the geographical, ideological and independence components.

Chapter III contains a historical overview of Eurocommunism, highlighting the significant events in the development of the three Eurocommunist parties: the French Communist Party (PCF), the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The study focuses upon the Italian Communist Party throughout the remainder of the work because of the significant size and strength of the PCI and the active role of Italy in the NATO Alliance. A Communist-dominated Italian government, whether in coalition with another political party or on its own, would create unique circumstances for the Alliance and its member nations.

Chapter IV discusses the NATO Alliance, describing the current condition and the recent developments that have occurred. The Italian contribution to NATO is presented, in addition to United States' interests in and PCI defense policies toward the Atlantic Alliance.

The likelihood of the Italian Communist Party rising to power in a future government is analyzed in Chapter V. Various aspects pertaining to domestic instability within Italy are presented as indicators of the possibility of PCI electoral success and governmental power. Analysis of the 1976 and 1979 national elections show interesting results relative to the public appeal of the PCI.

Chapter VI addresses the effects of Eurocommunism, specifically Italian Communism, upon the NATO Alliance. A spectral analysis shows varying degrees of impact upon the Alliance and its member nations. Further, alternatives to

NATO are proposed as a means of dealing with Communists in the government of a member nation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Chapter VII presents the conclusions, highlighting the outcome of what the United States may expect in the event the PCI gain positions of power in the government. The various responses of the United States are discussed in this concluding section.

This study has been aided by the guidance offered by Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. David Burke, and, for their assistance and valuable comments, the author is appreciative. An excellent opportunity was afforded the author by way of gaining insightful observations and opinions from national experts at the Eurocommunism Conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School in the Summer, 1978. Finally, an added degree of appreciation is extended to Dr. Valenta for his assistance in arranging for the author to personally interview well-known authorities on the subject of Eurocommunism on a visit to Washington, D.C. These experiences were most beneficial in the development of this study.

II. MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Before one can fully comprehend and evaluate the implications of Eurocommunism upon NATO or U.S./USSR relations, it is necessary to define the term and to identify those characteristics which distinguish this form of Communism from that practiced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

A. VARIATIONS IN MEANING

In an effort to present a more precise and complete picture of what Eurocommunism really means, three approaches have been pursued, each offering a variance in definition. The view from the Western world differs from that of the Eastern countries, which in turn is incongruent with the Eurocommunists' explanation of what they represent. Each sector poses interesting, thought-provoking aspects relevant to its particular geopolitical and cultural environment.

From the Western viewpoint, the experts are divided as to the mere existence of the tendency labeled Eurocommunism. Michael Ledeen, one of the most notable and often critical journalists, has voiced opposition frequently to those who state that Eurocommunism is an impending third schism in the world Communist movement. He cites as evidence supporting his position the failure of the "eurocommunist" summit, held in Madrid in March 1977, to produce a joint statement demonstrating cohesion among the three Communist Parties of Italy

(PCI), France (PCF) and Spain (PCE), known collectively as the Eurocommunists. This lack of unity showed the absence of a credible movement, especially in the area of human rights.¹ While James Goldsborough saw the Madrid summit as the primary force in legitimizing Eurocommunism,² Ledeen noted that the PCI, the PCF and the PCE agreed upon very little at the conference and were completely unprepared to take a unified public position on such an important issue as their relationship with the Soviet Union and other European nations. Because this lack of agreement, which carried over to other major aspects as well, includes the integration of Europe, support of the European Economic Community and the NATO Alliance, and the overall absence of a common program, Ledeen adheres to the theory that "there is no such thing as European Communism or Eurocommunism. Rather, there exist various forms of national Communism, which must be considered on a country-by-country basis, not as a unified effort."³

Ledeen's views run counter to those of the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who proclaimed that the challenges posed by the West European Communist Parties do not exist in isolation. Kissinger believes that a Communist breakthrough to power or a share in power via a coalition government in one country will have a significant psychological effect on the others. Such success will make the Communist Parties seem respectable or could suggest that the tide of history in Western Europe is flowing in the direction of the Communists.⁴

A well-known European political figure who shares the theory of non-existence espoused by Ledeen is Jacques Chirac, the Mayor of Paris and the President of the Gaullist Assembly for the Republic (RPR) political party. Chirac notes that the Eurocommunist parties would have to de-Stalinize themselves as well as modify their internal governing procedure of "democratic centralism" before being considered truly independent, democratic movements. Additionally, the detachment from Moscow necessary to prove their evolution has not occurred. According to Chirac, "Eurocommunism is a bet that we are urged to make on the capacity of Communists to change. As of now, nothing allows us to place this bet without grave risks."⁵

One can find views even further to the left when considering the phenomenon of Eurocommunism. As one author bluntly stated, "The independence of European Communists is a myth; when the chips are down their alliance with the USSR is unshakable."⁶ The term Eurocommunism has been classified as merely a catchword, labeling a pattern of tactical political maneuvering by the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties to show their distance from Moscow. Each has expressed its "independence" in its own way, in order to improve its image and election opportunities with the voters of the respective countries.⁷

From the positive aspect, that the trend does exist, Eurocommunism can take on various meanings and interpretations. Pierre Hassner, an expert in West European political affairs, offers one of the best analyses of this controversial term by

way of a three-fold definition. Taking the broadest view, Eurocommunism could be considered any form of Communism which expresses autonomy/independence from Moscow. Strictly speaking, the Communist Parties of Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and even China and Japan would fall within this broad definition. The converse, and narrowest definition, would include only those parties working to create a socialist Western Europe, united politically and demonstrating defense autonomy. This view finds a link between the struggle for democratic socialism and that for a united Europe. The shared characteristics of the Eurocommunists have a priority over and are stronger than the nationalistic features of each country. Finally, the middle definition, which has become the official one, accentuates programs and principles rather than opposition to Moscow. It emphasizes a pluralistic version of Communism, suited to developed, industrialized societies. It asserts that, in such societies socialism is inseparable from democracy, and it "pledges to maintain their complex social structure and liberal traditions and institutions not only on the road towards socialism but in socialist society itself."⁸ This definition appears to most clearly define the trend.

The well-known expert in Soviet studies, Vernon Aspaturian has offered four distinguishing characteristics which identify "Eurocommunism". These characteristics highlight the primary tenets of the concept and include:

(1) The organizational, tactical, and ideological autonomy and independence of each Communist Party in applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

(2) The renunciation of violent revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the irreversibility of Communist power as necessary elements in the creation of a socialist society. These are retrograded to optional rather than inevitable or necessary modes.

(3) Permanent commitment to the values of Western humanism, democratic values, and pluralism, i.e., pledging to honor the institutions of free and universal suffrage, freedom of opinion, expression, association, the right to strike, free movements of people, etc.

(4) Altering the balance between internal and external commitments in the search for a socialist and Communist society, i.e., giving higher priority to finding common ground with domestic kindred anti-capitalist political and social forces than to the preservation of common ground with the U.S.S.R. This, of course, represents a general trend in World Communism, whether in the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, China, ruling and non-ruling parties alike, of giving increasingly greater priority to the interests of domestic constituencies than to external constituencies or higher ideological abstractions.⁹

Aspects of these characteristics are evident in the writings and addresses of the Eurocommunist leaders of the three West European Communist Parties. Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI, Georges Marchais, head of the PCF, and the leader of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, have affirmed their support for this autonomous form of Communism.

The most outspoken of the three leaders, the PCE's Carrillo, wrote a book entitled Eurocommunism and the State. On the mission of Eurocommunism, he states:

Eurocommunism must show that the victory of the socialist forces in Western Europe will not multiply Soviet power nor presuppose the extension of the one-party Soviet model. It will be an independent experience with a more advanced socialism that will have a positive influence on the democratic evolution of the socialist models existing today.¹⁰

Similarly, Enrico Berlinguer, the General Secretary of the PCI, summarized the meaning of Eurocommunism at the Madrid summit by offering the following explanation:

What is being called Eurocommunism is the fruit of an elaboration that each of us has accomplished separately, taking into account the conditions of exploitation of the working class in each of our countries and of the workers' interests, and considering also what the developed countries of Western Europe have in common. It is not up to us to say whether this elaboration will also have an influence beyond Western Europe.¹¹

Berlinguer also defined Eurocommunism according to two criteria: 1) the union between socialism and freedom and 2) the effort to unite the workers' movement by bringing together European Socialists and Social Democrats. While the basis for such criteria appears legitimate and the desired results beneficial, the standards totally contradict the PCF's campaign against the Socialist Party and the conflict within the Union of the Left highlighting a Eurocommunist disagreement.¹²

The French Communist Party had a tradition of being the most Stalinist of the three Eurocommunist parties. It is also the least vocal in its declarations of independence. Historically, the French have held nationalism in the highest esteem and they are viewed with skepticism by the party elite of the PCI and the PCE. However, Marchais pledged his support to Eurocommunism and following the Madrid summit took strong exception to the headline of a "reactionary" French newspaper which called Eurocommunism a farce. "It is not a farce," stated Marchais. "It is something serious."¹³

Eurocommunism is viewed by the countries of Eastern Europe as very different from the dictatorial regimes under which they live. It offers an encouraging source of ideological justification and political effectiveness in their quest for increased independence from the USSR and the CPSU. It is considered a viable alternative to Russian Communism.

In Eastern Europe there exist significant differences between those who greet with enthusiasm the political opportunities associated with Eurocommunism and those who are apprehensive of its consequences. The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe can be separated into three distinct groups: the "autonomist" parties of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, the "centrist" parties of Poland and Hungary, and the "loyalist" parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.¹⁴ As each label would indicate, the Eastern European parties share differing relationships with the Soviet Union and profess opinions relative to their particular political standing in the world Communist movement. Eurocommunism has stimulated a new and divisive debate throughout the region. The supreme reaction of these regimes to Eurocommunism will depend to a great extent on the adjustments they make under changing social, economic and political conditions within their countries and to a lesser degree on the loyalists' ideological restraints.¹⁵

There exists little consensus on the meaning of Eurocommunism. Each author in the field offers a variation in definition and interpretation. Nevertheless, certain common

characteristics can be attributed to the term which describe it with some degree of accuracy and acceptability. Eurocommunism is recognized as a democratic form of Communism which is attempting to pursue an independent path toward socialism, free of Soviet domination and oppression. While lacking a precise concept or doctrine, Eurocommunism represents a trend toward a pluralistic socialism in the more developed industrialized countries of Western Europe. With this explanation as a basis for discussion, it is now useful to learn more about these unique Communist Parties.

B. GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECT

"Eurocommunism", when addressed literally, implies only that form of Communism practiced exclusively in Europe. As Hassner and others have noted, Eurocommunism could be extended to other nations of the world which profess independence from the CPSU, such as Japan and Australia. However, the roots of Eurocommunism lie in Western Europe, and specifically, within the three largest nations of Southern Europe: Italy, France and Spain. Certain conditions in these countries provide a favorable environment for the development of strong Communist Parties. Such factors are not present in the countries of Northern Europe where, with the exception of Finland, the Communist Parties are small and lack the political influence of the Latin countries to the South. Because of the relatively egalitarian societies with strongly rooted Social Democratic parties, there has been little appeal for the

Communist dogma and doctrines in countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland and Scandinavia.¹⁶

The unique case of West Germany is interesting in that the once strong Communist party has declined sharply in recent years. During the 1920s, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was not only the most aggressive Communist party but also the largest in Western Europe. The decimation of the party by Hitler was not followed by a rebirth in the former Western occupation zones as was the case in Italy. Between 1956 and 1968 the government outlawed as unconstitutional the Communist Party of Germany. Since its emergence with a new name, the German Communist Party (DKP) has failed to be a significant component in the West German political system, winning a slight 0.3 percent of the vote in the election of October 3, 1976.¹⁷

Before discussing the conditions which have proven advantageous to the growth and increased significance of the Communist Parties in Italy, France and Spain, the twenty-four countries having Communist Parties in Western Europe are listed in Table 1.

The largest Communist Parties are found in Italy, France and Spain. Various conditions within Italy favored the growth of a large Communist Party. It was difficult for a postwar Italian government to follow a forceful or uniform route to social reform. Reasons included the shallow base of unity in the country as well as the expansive economic abyss separating northern Italy from the south. There were also

TABLE 1

WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Population (est)</u> | <u>Communist Party Membership</u> | <u>Percent of Vote; Seats in Legislature</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Austria | 7,517,000 | 22,500 est. | 1.2 (1975); none |
| Belgium | 9,840,000 | 10,000 | 2 to 3 (1978); 4 of 212 |
| Cyprus | 641,000 | 11,500 est. | 30.0 (1976); 9 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats |
| Denmark | 5,106,000 | 8,000 est. | 3.7 (1977); 7 of 179 |
| Faroe Islands | 42,000 | insignificant | --(1977); none |
| Finland | 4,770,000 | 48,000 est. | 19.0 (1975); 40 of 200 |
| France | 53,446,000 | 650,000 claim | 20.6 (1978); 86 of 491 |
| Germany (FRG) | 61,520,000 | 46,380 claim | 0.3 (1976); none |
| Germany (West Berlin) | 2,100,000 | 7,500 est. | 1.9 (1975); none |
| Great Britain | 55,894,000 | 25,938 claim | 0.5 (1974); none |
| Greece | 9,309,000 | 27,500 est. | 9.3 (1977); 11 of 300 |
| Iceland | 224,000 | 3,000 est. | 22.9 (1978); 14 of 60 |
| Ireland | 3,288,000 | 600 est. | --(1977); none |
| Italy | 56,711,000 | 1,800,000 claim | 34.4 (1976); 228 of 630 |
| Luxembourg | 358,000 | 600 est. | 9.0 (1974); 5 of 59 |
| Malta | 334,000 | 100 est. | --(1976); none |
| Netherlands | 14,000,000 | 14,500 | 1.7 (1977); 2 of 150 |
| Norway | 4,061,000 | 2,250 est. | 5.2 (1977); 2 of 155 |
| Portugal | 9,786,000 | 142,000 claim | 14.6 (1976); 40 of 263 |
| San Marino | 20,000 | 300 est. | 21.1 (1978); 16 of 60 |
| Spain | 36,734,000 | 270,000 claim (200,000 est.) | 9.2 (1977); 20 of 350 |

TABLE 1 (CONTD)

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Population (est)</u> | <u>Communist Party Membership</u> | <u>Percent of Vote; Seats in Legislature</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Sweden | 8,273,000 | 17,000 est. | 2.5 (1976); 17 of 349 |
| Switzerland | 6,293,000 | 5,000 | 2.5 (1975); 6 of 200 |
| Turkey | 43,059,000 | 2,000 est. | --(1977) |
| TOTAL | 393,326,000 | 2,986,868 | |

SOURCE: R. F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979 (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. xii.

problems of a large and inefficient bureaucracy, the crippling of the government due to a series of shifting coalition cabinets, and the exemption of the wealthy from taxation, adding to the burden of the economic situation. The Christian Democratic Party (DC), the ruling political party since the 1940's, was unable to maintain its voter popularity because of its reputation for corruption, its failure to control the economy, and its refusal to espouse social reforms.¹⁸ The Communist Party capitalized on these deficiencies. The result was a very strong showing for the PCI in the June 1976 parliamentary elections, where the Communist Party won 34.4 percent of the vote. Since that date, however, popularity of the PCI has declined, with a drop in voter support to 30.4 percent in the June 1979 elections.

In France, the national situation is different.. France has a long tradition of revolutionary activity and the Communist Party has benefitted greatly from it. There is a vast gulf between the rich and the poor of France, more so than is evident in Italy. The laboring class has gained smaller proportions of economic prosperity compared to others of Western Europe. Aiding the growth of Communism was the discrediting of the Socialist Party, the main opponent of the Communists, with the working class of France by supporting colonial wars and by "playing the Fourth Republic parliamentary game."¹⁹ Finally, the French Communists were able to assume the mantle of national heroes in the resistance movement aimed against Hitler's domination of the country, which

enhanced their public image and national popularity. Following World War II, the PCF participated in coalition government until 1947. However, since 1958, the influence of the Communists has been decreasing. Currently, the Socialist Party is approximately twice as strong as the Communist Party in electoral support and would have been the obvious leader in any coalition between the two parties. Most polls predicted the success of this coalition in the March 1978 parliamentary elections, despite difficulties encountered the previous September in renegotiating the "common program". The result of the election was a surprising defeat for the PCF, which received 20.55 percent of the vote, the lowest percentage since 1945, with the exception of 1958. While the long-term effect on the PCF is unclear, it appears unlikely that the Communists will be able to rise to the high level of popularity seen in the Spring of 1977.

Just as the French case differs from the Italian, so does the Spanish differ from the others. Since its legalization in April 1977, the PCE has been outspoken in urging independence from the CPSU and emphasizing a strong national road to socialism. The party operated illegally and in exile from 1939 until 1977 and developed from a Stalinist, pro-Moscow party into an independent "Eurcommunist" party, the term used frequently by its leader, Santiago Carrillo. He runs the party, maintaining strict control over its operations. In its first post-Franco test of electoral appeal, the PCE did not do as well as expected, receiving 9.4 percent of the

vote. The 1979 election results also produced less than 10 percent. The PCE is the best organized force in post-Franco Spain, owing much of its effectiveness to Carrillo.²⁰

C. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

In a discussion of the diversities that separate the Communist Parties of Western Europe from the CPSU, it is important to identify the ideological differences between the two. Soviet Communism was founded on the teachings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin and strengthened by the totalitarian principles of Joseph Stalin. The Marxist-Leninist Model consists of the following basic tenets:

1. A deterministic and materialistic interpretation of history
2. A revolutionary transformation of the old society
3. Rule by a dictatorship of the working class, through the communist party
4. Egalitarianism in all areas of society
5. Anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism
6. Public ownership and state-governmental control of the important economic functions of society
7. Building a progressive-humanitarian society which promotes the welfare of all citizens in matters of health, education, employment and culture.²¹

The Eurocommunist parties do not adhere to these principles, but rather express views of democratic pluralism and support parliamentary institutions. They disavow rule by revolutionary tactics. The classic Soviet definition of a communist revolutionary shows him, in the words of Joseph Stalin, as one who "without evasions, unconditionally,

openly, and honestly makes the cause of world revolution synonymous with the interests and, indeed, with the defense of the USSR."²² Certainly, the liberal Western European Communist Parties do not advocate such a view. Not only do they believe that the peaceful road to socialism is the best and safest one, but they also disagree with the required support and defense of the Soviet Union.

Other ideological differences exist that are unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. The rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the European Communist Parties and the abandonment of class struggle are two significant actions by the Eurocommunists. The party elite of the CPSU viewed these moves as direct steps away from the Soviet model. It can be assumed that these independence-oriented gestures caused serious difficulties to the Russian leaders. The continued affirmation of national independence by the Western European parties could affect seriously the hegemonial control of the USSR over the Soviet Bloc nations.²³

To the Russians, the "supreme form of democracy" is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The PCI, the PCF and the PCE have eliminated this concept. Similarly, proletarian internationalism, referring to obedience to Moscow, is strongly emphasized by the Soviet Union. However, the French proclaim socialisme aux couleurs de la France, the Italians stress "critical solidarity", and the Spanish announce that the old-style internationalism is dead. The PCE believe that they alone will be responsible for the "Spanish road to socialism."²⁴

Two accomplishments by the Eurocommunists appear to show a real distinction between these parties and other Communist Parties in the world. The declarations separate the Eurocommunists from the Soviets. First, in the area of domestic policy goals, the Eurocommunists stated emphatically that they will pursue these goals on the basis of national needs, adapting Marxist theory to their cultural, political, intellectual, national and economic conditions. Second, they declared their freedom to determine issues of foreign policy without reference to or consideration of Soviet foreign policy demands, decisions or pronouncements. The latter proclamation is of particular import in that some of the West European Communist Parties are eager to become members of the left-wing broad coalition governments and assert that the foreign policy programs they pursue will be based on national interests, not Soviet demands or interests.²⁵

These statements of independence show that there is a strong surge for ideological freedom from the Soviet Union developing in Western Europe. This divergence from the ideological constraints of the USSR is another example of the ability of the Eurocommunists to demonstrate their autonomy. Many experts agree that the Eastern European countries are bound to the USSR not by ideology but rather by mutual defense. It is obvious that neither applies to Western Europe.

D. INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW?

Just as there are critics who discount the existence of Eurocommunism so, too, are there writers and scholars who say that independence of this Communist group from Moscow is a hoax, a complete myth. Many examples are cited as instances when the Eurocommunists have shown loyalty rather than hostility toward the Soviet Union. One of the chief areas of controversy concerns Soviet foreign policy actions. None of the three Eurocommunist Parties voiced criticism or opposition to the transportation of Cuban troops in Russian aircraft into Angola. In fact, Georges Marchais strongly approved of the involvement of Cuban soldiers at the direction of Moscow.

Of greater significance are the more recent pronouncements of the French Communists regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. The French Communist Party supported the military intervention in Afghanistan. In a statement issued by the party's Politburo on January 5, 1980, the PCF endorsed the right of all nations to request assistance from allies to prevent foreign interference. In fact, shortly thereafter, Party leader Marchais visited Moscow at the invitation of Leonid Brezhnev, thereby reinforcing his support for the Soviet action and diminishing, if not eliminating his Communist party from those known as Eurocommunist. On the issue of Afghanistan, the French Communists stood alone. The PCI and the PCE condemned

the Soviet actions as a violation of the principles of independence and sovereignty.²⁶

Unlike Angola, on the other hand, the contretemps in Zaire was viewed in a different light by the Eurocommunists. As a form of foreign aid being offered by the West, the Zaire episode was considered an incident which, according to the Eurocommunists, should have been resolved without foreign interference. This is an example of the anti-Western attitude of the Communist Parties of Western Europe.

Other examples of congruence with Soviet policy include the sudden shift of the three parties from staunch support of Somalia to backing Ethiopia, and the condemnation of Israeli liberation of Jewish hostages at Entebbe as "an intolerable violation of Ugandan national sovereignty."²⁷ In each of these cases, support for the Soviet Union was strong and evident. According to Ledeen, no Eurocommunist party has clashed with the Kremlin on foreign policy issues. He states that on matters involving the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, there is virtual identity of foreign policies between the Western European Communists and the Soviet Union.²⁸ However, the recent events in Afghanistan dispel this theory.

While such may be the case in most instances, there is room for discussion and exception to the statement that there exists complete concurrence on foreign policy matters between the Soviet Union and the Eurocommunists. To cite

examples, one need only look to Spain and its views on certain major issues to see a contradiction to this theory. The Communist Party of Spain has declared strong support for the European Economic Community, has expressed tolerance of Spain's entry into the NATO Alliance and has shown enthusiasm for the presence of US bases in Spain. These actions demonstrate a clear position of independence from Moscow as well as incongruence on issues of foreign policy, as does the Spanish and Italian condemnation of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Roy Macridis discusses three basic criteria which measure the degree of independence of a communist party vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Macridis concludes that the longer a country has conformed to Soviet policies, the surer will be its subservience. Second, the policy "stakes" involved must be taken into account. Each action of a communist party is weighed by the Kremlin and, when the stakes are too high, the Soviet Union will step in and take control. Third, concerns the manner in which the national communist party responds to Soviet cues. The greater the response to a Soviet policy stand, the greater the subservience.²⁹

With the Eurocommunist parties, there is a "grey area" of behavior between independence and subordination. Two basic models, highlighted by Macridis, can be used to evaluate the actions of the Western European Communist Parties. The "international" model assumes that close ties exist among

all communist parties of the world and that the CPSU furnishes the leadership and, thereby, maintains and exercises control over them. The second model, the "national" model, under the label of Eurocommunism, espouses the independence of the national communist parties to follow goals for the good of national interests and needs, regardless of Soviet imperatives.³⁰

The "national" model was clearly emphasized by Jean Kanapa, head of the Foreign Affairs section of the Politbureau of the PCF, when he declared that the French have a strong desire to mold their own path to socialism. Kanapa wrote that the PCF defines its own policy objectives independently and tolerates no foreign interference.³¹ While this may have been true at one time, Marchais' post-Afghanistan visit to Moscow raises doubt about this policy.

Jacques Chirac, President of the Gaullist Party, is very critical of the PCF and its proclamations. Chirac notes that the PCF supported Soviet aggression in Africa and he claims that neither the PCI nor the PCE are independent of the Kremlin. As documentation, he quotes Berlinguer's statement that "the Soviet Union's policy of peace is pursued in the general interest of humanity", and Chirac notes that Carrillo insists on the "resolutely defensive character of the Warsaw Pact."³²

An even stronger testimony of the loyalty of the PCI is presented by Ledeen when he quotes the famous statement

of Berlinguer to the London Times in February 1976:

We support the fundamental philosophy behind the policy of peaceful coexistence and détente that is being practiced by the Soviet Union...the Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general interest of mankind.³³

Ledeen also notes that the fidelity to Moscow transcends the foreign policy issues to include financial dependence. At the end of World War II, the PCI was totally dependent on Soviet aid for survival. The party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, attempted to reduce this reliance on Russian support and developed a successful import-export operation with the PCI as the "middleman" for Italian businesses trading behind the Iron Curtain. While this action did benefit the party and lessened dependence on direct Soviet aid, the PCI still relies on Russian transactions for income.³⁴

While the Eurocommunists profess independence and self-reliance, there is a real question as to the validity of this claim. There is more freedom of speech and action in Western Europe than in countries of the Soviet Bloc. However, the belief that Eurocommunist parties are independent is still open to debate. As Hassner stated, the Eurocommunists "remain Communist Parties retaining centralized organization and a measure of loyalty to the Soviet Union."³⁵

An area of general agreement among writers on Eurocommunism is that there is no consensus on either the existence of the trend or the meaning of the term. However, the

subject is an important one in that the possibility of the phenomenon becoming a viable element of Western European government cannot be ruled out. Whether "Eurocommunism" or "Western European Communist Parties", however this group of moderate Communists is labeled, one should be ready to understand and cope with this brand of Communism. A discussion of the development of the Eurocommunist trend will aid in this understanding. By being aware of the origins of the parties and the influences which played a significant role in the formation of the doctrines and principles of the parties, it is easier to comprehend the proclamations of the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties.

III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE PCI

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMMUNISM

When considering the origins of Eurocommunism and its evolution, the question arises as to the "newness" of this trend. Statements espousing "national roads to socialism" and "devotion to democratic principles" were witnessed shortly after World War II by the leaders of the various European Communist Parties.¹

In (our country) there is a division of functions, and State power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. (Our country) can proceed and is proceeding along her own road.

-Speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka
Polish Communist Party Leader
(January, 1946)

The crux of the matter, and we Marxists should know this well, is this: every nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union, but by its own road, dependent on its historical, national, social and cultural circumstances.

-Speech by Georgi Dimitrov
Leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party
(February, 1946)

The Communist Party seeks to attain Socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to Socialism...The coalition of the Communists with other parties is not opportunistic, a temporarily limited coalition, but the expression...of all strata of the working people... We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods...be expressed in constitutional law.

-Statement by Klement Gottwald
Communist Party leader of Czechoslovakia
(January, 1947)

The views expressed by these leaders of Eastern European countries in the 1940's parallel those of the current spokesmen of the Western Communist Parties.

Major post-war events contributed to the rise of Eurocommunism. The departure of Yugoslavia's Tito from the Communist camp in 1948, the uprisings in Poland and Hungary during the mid-1950's and, most notably, the split of the Chinese Communist Party from the Soviet Union in 1960-61, aided the development of more democratic government by the Western Communists. The Prague Spring of 1968, the attempt of Czechoslovak reformers to create a model of socialism unlike that of the Soviets and based on Western tradition, is considered by one leading expert on the Soviet Union to be "the forerunner of Eurocommunism."² The support offered by the PCI, PCF and PCE for Dubcek and his policy of "socialism with a human face" was the first joint action by these three groups of Eurocommunists.

These events and other minor demonstrations against the authority of the Soviet Union have eroded the monolithic feature of Russian Communism, established by Lenin and strengthened by Stalin. The inability of Moscow to organize a recent world-wide Communist and Workers' Parties meeting contributed to the deterioration of the Soviet hold on Communist Parties around the globe. The last such gathering, the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, held in East Berlin in June, 1976 was to address the "struggle

for peace, security, cooperation, and social progress in Europe" and was to be held "no later than mid-1975."³

From the initial requests for the meeting in November 1973 until its convening, over two and one-half years of laborious preparation had elapsed. There was great difficulty in achieving agreement on a document acceptable to all participants. While the Soviets and their "loyalist" supporters desired a reconfirmation of the principles of democratic centralism, dictatorship of the proletariat and the undisputed position of the CPSU leadership over world communism, the Eurocommunists, joined by the Romanians and the Yugoslavs, strongly opposed these concepts. The final document was a major defeat for Moscow, with the CPSU conceding the very issues the Eurocommunists were demanding so vehemently (i.e., abandonment of the principle of "proletarian internationalism," formal recognition of the equality and autonomy of every Communist Party, and so forth).

The unquestioned victory of the West European Communists at the East Berlin conference added momentum to their drive for independence from the Soviets. It was clear following this pan-European conference that the differences between the two Communists groups were major in scope and depth and were most likely irreconcilable. It was highly unlikely that another such meeting would be held any time in the near future, owing to the deep schism and open disagreement witnessed in East Berlin.

In March, 1977 the three Eurocommunist parties showed their strongest determination to express their independence and unity while resisting Soviet pressures, which had emerged after Berlin. At a summit meeting in Madrid to signify support for the soon-to-be legalized Spanish Communist Party, Berlinguer and Marchais joined Carrillo in an unprecedented move. Against the authority of the Soviet Union and in direct violation of an earlier warning from the Russians in 1974 that no regional meetings of Communists were to be held nor was any Communist Party to organize a Congress without Soviet representation,⁴ the three Communist leaders met openly and discussed topics of national as well as regional concern. It was following this meeting that, according to James Goldsborough, "they came away calling themselves Eurocommunists."⁵

As previously noted, the French, Spanish and Italian Communist Parties are considered to be Eurocommunists. It is the PCI that is the most significant of the three for various reasons. The PCF suffered a decisive setback in the March 1978 national elections. The Communists polled only 19 percent of the vote, one of the lowest percentages since World War II, thus placing the PCF on the political sidelines for the time being. Additionally, France has not participated in the integrated military organization of the NATO Alliance since its dramatic withdrawal in 1966. The Spanish party is still relatively small in membership, attracting a slight nine percent of the vote in the June 1977

and 1979 elections. While Spain does maintain bi-lateral agreements with the United States, authorizing the use of its territory for military bases, Spain is not a member of NATO.

The PCI is the second largest political party in Italy and, notwithstanding a recent decline in voter popularity, evidenced by a four percent loss of voter support in the June 1979 national election, the Communists could stage a significant resurgence at this precarious period in the country's history. Furthermore, Italy is an active member in the NATO Alliance, participating in such committees as the Nuclear Planning Group, and providing armed forces and bases in support of allied defense. Because of this direct participation in NATO and the possibility of a government including the Communist Party, two factors not evident in France and Spain, this study now concentrates attention on Italy and its unique circumstances pertaining to the PCI.

To understand more fully the policies and positions of the Italian Communist Party regarding domestic and international affairs, it is useful to have a knowledge of the origins of this significant political party. An historical discussion provides a valuable tool in analyzing the present day principles of the PCI and understanding the basis for the current doctrines of the party.

B. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PCI

The origins of the Italian Communist Party can be traced to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The

PCI was an outgrowth of a Marxist tradition created by the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the political force that had represented the poor, the laborers and the underprivileged element of Italy's population. Throughout the pre-World War I years, a tension had been rising between factions within the PSI. On the one side were those supporting a humanistic Marxist approach while on the other were party members following an intellectual, doctrinal Marxism.⁶

The PCI was established in January, 1921 at the Seventeenth Party Congress of the PSI, held in Livorno. A group of radical Socialists, in response to Lenin's 21 Conditions and the establishment of the Comintern, declaring that the party was not revolutionary enough, and, therefore not representing its views, severed relations with the PSI, thus forming the PCI. The following year saw the rise to power of the Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, the new Prime Minister of Italy. Having achieved a 65 percent majority in the elections of April 1924, the Fascists stepped up action against the Communists with Mussolini launching a major attack against his internal enemy.

Under the strong leadership of Antonio Gramsci, "the patron saint of the Italian Communist Party,"⁷ the PCI by 1923 began to develop a highly effective and well-disciplined structure whose goal was the formation of a communist state. The commitment and loyalty to the Soviet Union was unquestioned. The PCI was forced underground in 1926 following

the arrest and imprisonment of Gramsci by Mussolini. The leadership of the party was passed by the Comintern to Palmiro Togliatti, another intellectual figure within the PCI. A close friend of Gramsci, Togliatti was in Moscow at the time of the arrest, representing the PCI at Comintern Headquarters. He would lead the party for the next thirty-eight years, proving to be highly instrumental in molding its present day positions. Until his death in 1964, Togliatti remained the party's chief, in the beginning as a little-known exile and by 1944, as one of the country's most respected and feared public figures.⁸

From 1928 until 1934, the Italian Communists remained in exile and isolated from other opposition groups. However, a dramatic change in party position occurred in 1934 when the PCI joined the Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni and Giuseppe Saragat, to fight against Fascism. It is significant to note that this action, sanctioned by the Comintern at its Seventh Congress in 1935, was the beginning of a series of "unity of action" pacts formed by these parties.⁹ This period of the Popular Front (1934-1939) saw most action taking place in Spain during its Civil War with the Communists fighting to aid the Republicans and Mussolini providing support to Franco's regime.

The Spanish Civil War and the "Armed Resistance" movement in Northern Italy contributed toward the PCI's entrance into the heroic phase of its history. With all its strength

directed toward fighting the Fascist enemy, the PCI was able to acquire the moral and political distinction that transformed it from an insignificant exile organization into a powerful political party of the masses.¹⁰

C. THE POST-WAR YEARS

The end of World War II witnessed the emergence of a powerful Communist Party in Italy. Factors contributing to this position of strength included an ever-increasing party membership, unified in structure and inspired by the prison writings of Antonio Gramsci, a formidable performance during the Resistance movement and an organizational base throughout the country and in the labor unions.¹¹

Between 1943 and 1947 the party membership grew dramatically. Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of this growth.

TABLE 2
GROWTH OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
1941-1947

| Year | Membership |
|----------------|------------|
| 1941 | 3,000 |
| 1944 | 500,000 |
| 1945 | 1,700,000 |
| 1947 | 2,250,000 |

SOURCE: Donald L.M. Blackmer, "Postwar Italian Communism," Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 35.

The incredibly rapid growth of the PCI aided it in realizing Palmiro Togliatti's model of the partito nuovo, a model whose purpose was to combine the virtues of a cadre party and a mass party. With difficulty, Togliatti convinced many of the PCI organizers that the strategy of national unity declared in 1944 had its organizational counterpart in the partito nuovo:

...our party must today become a great mass party; and this is why we say to the old comrades, who might have a tendency to remain a small group, the group of those who have remained pure, faithful to the ideals and to the thought, we say to them: "You are wrong, you will be a leading group to the degree that you will be able to make of our party a great mass party, a great organizer which has in its own ranks all the elements necessary to establish contacts with all categories of the Italian people and to direct them all toward the goals that we are proposing to achieve."¹²

Togliatti proposed a set of policy guidelines to be followed by the PCI in carrying out its strategy of attaining power. These imperatives provided the basis for a great deal of the PCI's behavior during Togliatti's lifetime and on through the 1970's. While this party behavior may have been inconsistent at times due to changes in the international climate (i.e., the Cold War), it tends to have its foundation in these imperatives of Togliatti:

- (1) Renounce violent seizure as the means to obtain power in Italy.

- (2) Avoid at all costs a direct confrontation with the Catholic Church. Eschew anticlericalism; seek an accommodation with the Catholic hierarchy.

- (3) Avoid sectarianism and isolation in politics and society. Seek points of communication, accommodation, and common action with other groups, including segments of the middle class.

(4) Play a major role in shaping the institutions of the democratic republic. Be prepared to accept these institutions, to operate within them, and to defend them against attack and erosion.

(5) Avoid contributing to the reemergence or growth of a strong right-wing political movement.

(6) Press for fundamental social and economic transformations and bring the pressure of public opinion and popular organizations to bear in favor of them. Do not be too specific, however, about the content of these reforms before the party comes to power.¹³

The Italian Communist Party actively participated in the parliamentary government during the immediate post-war years. The Minister of Justice until 1947 was the party leader, Togliatti. With internal politics at work, however, a shift of authority took place in the election year of 1948. The Communists suffered a severe loss to the newly formed coalition of Christian Democrats (DC), Social Democrats (PSDI) and Liberals (PLI). The election results of April, 1948 showed the DC with a clear majority of 307 seats in the Chamber of Deputies while the Communist-Socialist front elected only 182 deputies. The failure of the policy of constructive cooperation with other parties and the Church, adopted by the Communists, produced a serious setback to the party.¹⁴

An extended "period of confrontation"¹⁵ (1948-1953) followed this major defeat of the PCI. As a result of its policy of collaboration, the Italian Communists were severely criticized by Moscow which scorned the party for thinking that such participation with bourgeoisie governments could be

conceivable. The PCI reverted to a policy more clasically Communist in nature. The Communists acted in a basically constructive manner within parliament. However, on both the domestic and international levels, the party voiced opposition to the policies being enacted by the Italian leadership (i.e., membership in the NATO Alliance, participation in the Marshall Plan). Such objections were made in the context of its minority position and the PCI accepted its limited role at the time.¹⁶ The party concentrated its efforts on strengthening its "presence" in all realms of Italian society, the arts, the sciences, mass media and so forth.

During the 1950's, the PCI gained a slight degree of political maneuverability. Furthermore, the party was aided in its resumption of a strategy of alliances by the Soviet shift to "peaceful co-existence" as well as the de-Stalinization of the CPSU and the developing Sino-Soviet split.

In 1956, Secretary General Togliatti publicly announced the party's domestic strategy of the "Italian road to socialism," and the doctrine of "polycentrism." This proclamation signalled no new or drastic shift in party policy. However, as expressed by Norman Kogan, "the doctrine threatened the organizational essence of the international Communist movement, for it rejected the role of the Soviet Union as the leading state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the guiding party of that movement."¹⁷ It was a philosophy such as this that carried over into present day

trends and formed a basis for the Western European Communist Parties' independence of the CPSU, hence Eurocommunism.

Despite a leftward swing of the political spectrum in the late 1950's, the PCI was unable to reap any immediate benefits. A major political development occurred in 1963 with the formation of a center-left coalition government, frequently referred to as "the opening to the left." This coalition, including the DC, the Socialists, along with the Social Democrats and the Republicans, governed Italy for almost fifteen years. During this time, the PCI was encountering internal organizational splits. With the death of Togliatti in 1964, his strong-armed, authoritarian style of rule could not be passed on to his successor, Luigi Longo. Differences within the leadership were accentuated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Serious questions arose: How closely should the PCI collaborate with non-Communist parties? How strictly should the party adhere to Moscow's international leadership?¹⁸

Notwithstanding these factional difficulties, the PCI continued to gain strength in the electoral process, especially with the new center-left government proving to lack the strength necessary to counter the country's economic and social weaknesses. Table 3 provides a clear picture of the electoral history of the three largest parties in Italy.

Not only at the national level, but also at the local level, the Communists were making great advances in popularity, proving themselves to be efficient and honest administrators.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE FOR THE THREE
MAJOR ITALIAN PARTIES, 1946-1976

| Year | Communist Party | Socialist Party | Christian Democrats |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1946 | 18.9 | 20.7 | 35.2 |
| 1948 ^a | } 31.0 | { | 48.5 |
| 1953 | | | 40.0 |
| 1958 | 22.7 | 14.3 | 42.4 |
| 1963 | 25.3 | 13.9 | 38.3 |
| 1968 | 27.0 | 14.5 ^b | 39.1 |
| 1972 | 27.2 | 9.6 | 38.7 |
| 1976 | 34.4 | 9.6 | 38.7 |
| 1979 ^c | 30.4 | 9.8 | 38.3 |

SOURCE: Giacomo Sani, "Mass Support for Italian Communism," Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori, eds., Euro-communism: The Italian Case (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 69.

^aCommunists and Socialists contested the election of 1948 together.

^bThe Socialists ran with the Social Democrats in 1968.

^cUpdated results included by author (Los Angeles Times, December 25, 1979).

With the socioeconomic condition of the country deteriorating to crisis proportions, it was becoming more evident every day that Italy could not be governed without Communist participation.

D. THE 1970'S

The beginning of a new decade saw the change in party leadership of the PCI shift once again from Luigi Longo to Enrico Berlinguer in 1972. Shortly thereafter, in the fall of 1973, Berlinguer surprised the world as well as his fellow party members by announcing that the PCI would accept and support a compromesso storico. The significance of such a move and the meaning of the phrase itself warrant explanation and elaboration. Berlinguer realized that a 51 percent majority would be insufficient to govern the country and draw it out of its economic and social malaise. The experience of Allende in Chile was another factor which greatly contributed to Berlinguer's proposal of a broad coalition of democratic parties to govern Italy. It was evident that too narrow a front policy would polarize the society and would incite a reactionary counter-attack.

Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler in their book 'Euro-communism' Implications for East and West, present a concise analysis of the strategy of the historic compromise.¹⁹ The compromesso storico exists on two levels. First, in social terms, it is "an attempted unification of a broad range of diverse social groups, including both the proletariat and... 'the Catholic masses.'"²⁰ Secondly, it is political: the securing of a party alliance between the PCI and the DC. The social content is an appealing and seductive propaganda point with the bourgeois politicians. With an aim toward uniting potentially antagonistic groups in order to stabilize

the system, the historic compromise is an appeal for order, authority and unity, a national longing in an unsettled country. Such an aim is an obvious vote winner. While the PCI has increased its showing in national elections since 1946 (excluding 1979), it has only surpassed the 30 percent barrier since its historic compromise matured into PCI policy. It remains the most ambitious, daring strategy for power of any Western European Communist Party.²¹

Under the leadership of Berlinguer, the PCI has made dramatic gains in electoral support. Notwithstanding a recent decline, the party had surpassed previous obstacles of society, religion and politics to become a major influence in the country. In 1974, the PCI succeeded in winning a national referendum for the reform of Italy's divorce law. The following year saw increased electoral strength in regional elections, with the PCI playing a major role in every principal Italian city and controlling the administrations of 25 percent of the country's regions. The highest success of all came in the 1976 parliamentary elections when the PCI amassed a stunning 34.4 percent of the vote, a spectacular showing for the party. With this victory came the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and four committee chairmanships in the Chamber and three in the Senate. While the PCI did not gain a formal role in the government, the government could not function without the cooperation of the Communists.²²

Since the 1976 elections, the Italian Communist Party has encountered a number of serious difficulties. In 1977 the party lost much of its influence among the student population. Luciano Lama, the Communist head of the General Confederation of Italian Laborers, was driven off the campus at Rome University in February when trying to play the role of the peacemaker in student disputes.²³

The governmental crisis of January-March 1978 was resolved in a manner which humiliated and injured the PCI and its image. It was begun reluctantly by the Communists shortly after an enormous strike and demonstration in Rome organized by the militant Metalworkers' Union in December. While the Communists could not ignore the success of the uprising, they realized the political repercussions of drawing this situation to a head. The party responded to calls for decisive governmental action against the current economic chaos by demanding full participation in the government. The Christian Democrats were determined not to relent under such demands. This caused the PCI to back down to a more flexible position as it did not want to force new elections. History has shown that the political party that precipitates an election does not fare well in the polls.

The PCI agreed to support a cabinet of highly qualified independent or technical ministers. While Prime Minister Andreotti initially agreed to these Communist wishes, he did not uphold his promise, but rather appointed an all-Christian Democratic cabinet on March 15, 1978, causing

extreme embarrassment to the PCI.²⁴ The Communists were allowed to vote for the government in the parliamentary vote of confidence, not just abstain from voting against it.²⁵

Compounding this situation was the sensational kidnapping and brutal murder of Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro, the father of rapprochement between the DC and the PCI. Terrorism escalated throughout the country, causing concern among all factions of Italy. The Communists could not avoid criticism accusing them of involvement in the shocking Moro event. Condemnation was followed by loss of support in the local elections of May, just one week after Moro's body was found near PCI headquarters in Rome. While the PCI anticipated a minor setback, the magnitude of their losses, an eight percent decline in votes, came as a devastating shock which demoralized the party.²⁶

In January 1979, the government fell once again when Berlinguer announced that the PCI would not support the government. The Andreotti government fell after an eleven-month alliance with the Italian Communists, the thirty-sixth in the past thirty-four years. The Communists insisted upon seats in the new government, and when refused, Berlinguer proclaimed that he will take his party into the opposition for the first time since 1976.

The PCI held its Fifteenth National Congress in Rome from March 30th to April 3rd, 1979. Much had changed since the previous Congress in 1975, held on the eve of the local election when the PCI nearly surpassed the DC in voter support.

The central message delivered by the "doleful-looking" secretary Berlinguer at the recent Congress was that the party's strategy of 1973 of forming an "historic compromise" had "evaporated."²⁷ Enthusiasm within the party had waned as it faced the prospect of losing a fair number of votes in the upcoming June election. Furthermore, party membership, at approximately 1,790,000 was down 24,000 from the previous year. New recruitment to the PCI in 1978 was 41 percent lower than in 1976.²⁸

Pessimism proved well-founded as the PCI emerged from the June 3-4, 1979 national elections with 30.4 percent of the vote, a major decline of four percent from the 1976 returns. This was the first decline in party support in more than twenty years. While the victory of 1976 was not repeated in 1979, the PCI is strong and a force to reckon with. In the words of Enrico Berlinguer on the night of the defeat, "There will still be the Communist question to resolve; they will still have to come to terms with our party."²⁹

The power and force behind this statement of Berlinguer's reinforces the need to be ever-aware of the Communist Party of Italy. This discussion of the development and current status of the Italian Communist Party aids in understanding the present position of Italy within the NATO Alliance. By realizing the potential strength and capabilities of the PCI and the significant role the Communists could play in future governments, it is now logical to focus attention

upon the NATO Alliance. How credible a deterrent is the Alliance? What are the attitudes of its members to its ability to combat enemy aggression? Can NATO be depended upon in time of crisis and how will the integral components (i.e., the member nations) respond to a threat to its security?

IV. THE NATO ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY

A. THE NATO ALLIANCE

From its establishment in April, 1949, NATO has maintained as its primary objective the deterrence of Soviet aggression in Western Europe. For the past thirty years, the Alliance has enhanced the cohesion of Western Europe, providing the needed stability and confidence for the pursuit of détente and realistic arms control. The magnitude of the NATO Alliance is evident in the fact that the treaty area encompasses over 8.5 million square miles and includes a population in excess of 560 million. The combined military manpower of the Alliance consists of 4.3 million members in the regular armed forces and 5.1 million in the reserves.¹

While the goal of deterrence of aggression has been constant, there has arisen a serious doubt as to the recent capability of the Alliance to defend itself from its main enemy, the Soviet Union. Studies have been conducted by the Congress as well as the Department of Defense to ascertain the warfighting capability of the NATO Alliance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact nations. One such report was issued by the subcommittee on the Atlantic Alliance of the House Armed Services Committee in February, 1979. The panel asserted that the Alliance lacked the means to defend Europe and called NATO's potential to fight a protracted war "almost non-existent."² The report further stated

The major readiness deficiency of the NATO Alliance is that it does not have enough resources to provide a credible defense...Evidence available...suggests that European forces will begin to run out of equipment and ammunition in a matter of days rather than weeks and months...³

Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett, presented an enlightening and informative report in January, 1977. It addressed various aspects of NATO in relation to the "new Soviet threat." Specifically, in discussing the state of Alliance defenses today, the co-authors stated that NATO defenses are not what they should be. Six major problem areas were identified as possible causes of the deteriorated condition. These included: (1) declining real defense expenditures, especially in the crucial Central Region, (2) shrinking active force levels, (3) the refusal of France to participate in NATO's integrated military commands, (4) pulling back of key formations to the Low Countries, (5) continued dissipation of NATO combat power through reliance on many different weapons, tactics, procedures and supplies, and, finally, (6) the inability of NATO's conventional forces to counter increased Warsaw Pact defense build-up.⁴

An assessment of the effects of Eurocommunism on the NATO Alliance is dependent upon the strength of the organization as well as the power structure of NATO. The cohesion of the Alliance is of primary importance. NATO has frequently been described as being in "a state of shocking disarray."⁵ But Robert Osgood point outs, it's no wonder that such is the

description, considering that NATO is a peacetime alliance among many democratic countries with divergent as well as convergent interests. In addition, the Alliance requires continual budgetary sacrifices and inter-allied accommodations to preserve military security when the prospect of Soviet offensive action generally appears remote and hypothetical.⁶

Despite all this, the NATO Alliance has managed to maintain its strength and relative stability through great changes in East-West relations, inter-allied associations and political and economic situations. It serves the military and political purposes for which it was established. According to Osgood, "NATO could not have done so if it were not regarded by its member governments and their constituents as vital to their national security and to cooperative and orderly relations with each other."⁷

With the highlighting of these observations, what can be said about the current threat to NATO? Unlike past threats, which included the prospect of active Soviet aggression, the control of nuclear weapons, the doubts about the continued maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe, to name a few, today's threats involve the steady growth in military capability of the Warsaw Pact vis-à-vis NATO, the reduced and uncertain ties of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the danger of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era, and the prospect of Communists obtaining positions of power and dominance in Italy.⁸ The Eurocommunists pose a challenge to

NATO as well. Within the context of the NATO/Warsaw Pact military strength debate, Senators Nunn and Bartlett have delineated further the actual threatening areas as ground force expansion, ground force modernization, the transformation of Soviet tactical airpower and the decreased warning time advantage held by the Soviets.⁹

While the problems facing NATO are serious ones and the threat from the Russians ever present, NATO continues to be the key to the defense of Western Europe. Notwithstanding the internal problems of the organization and the question of the credibility of NATO, the Alliance is basically sound and will continue to pursue its goal of countering the USSR and thereby securing peace in Western Europe.

B. RECENT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

Within the past three years, major developments have occurred relative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the May 1977 NATO Summit held in London, President Jimmy Carter startled the treaty members with the request for a commitment to a 3 percent annual increase in defense spending as a means to remedy substantial deficiencies within the organization. Such a program was scheduled to begin in 1979 and last for five years. Several nations were unable to meet this goal while some governments refused to allocate the designated amount for defense expenditures. But, the Alliance as a whole has managed to commit approximately 2.9 percent in the first year, bolstered greatly by France, Germany and

the United Kingdom, where defense spending escalated by 5 percent in 1979.¹⁰

A second significant program was proposed by the U.S. at the London conference. President Carter initiated a recommendation calling for NATO to increase its combat readiness and to maintain the credibility of its strategy for the next fifteen years. The program, known as the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), represents an unprecedented attempt by the Alliance in these areas and covers ten categories where major improvements are needed:¹¹

- (1) combat readiness, to deal with the threat of surprise attack;
- (2) reinforcement, to speed the movement of troops to Europe and forward areas in time of crisis;
- (3) reserve mobilization, to use existing manpower more effectively;
- (4) maritime posture, to counter the growing Soviet naval capability;
- (5) air defense, to counter more sophisticated Soviet air forces;
- (6) command, control and communications, to provide secure and reliable communications between dispersed headquarters and to enhance the survivability of command centers;
- (7) electronic warfare, to counter Warsaw Pact capabilities;
- (8) rationalization of arms development and production, to improve cost effectiveness through weapons standardization and enhanced interoperability;
- (9) logistics procedures and organization; and
- (10) theater nuclear force modernization.

The implementation of the program was endorsed at the May 1978 summit held in Washington, D.C., where the plan was reviewed in detail. By extending over a fifteen year period, the program permits the utilization of orderly, efficient weapons and equipment design and production, rather than the present "every-country-for-itself" system. One additional "plus" to the program came at the 1978 summit when the armaments directors of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed upon acceleration of arms cooperation between Europe and the United States, a bold experiment and a very promising effort.¹²


Tracing the recent NATO conferences one step further, the May 1979 summit produced major contributions toward improvement of the Alliance. The defense ministers agreed upon a two-year extension - to 1986 - of the plan to increase the annual defense spending figure by 3 percent. While no more binding than the original agreement, it is a strong restatement of NATO's conviction that this is the lowest level of increase which will keep the member countries from being outclassed by all the different types of new equipment being brought into the Warsaw Pact nations.¹³ The ministers also approved the largest budget for infrastructure spending in the history of NATO, approximately \$4.5 billion over the next five years, to be spent on roads, barracks, pipelines, communications links and so forth.¹⁴

The most consequential event to occur recently was the decision by the NATO Alliance to modernize its Western

Europe nuclear strike force with a new generation of medium-range missiles capable of striking deep into the Soviet Union. The plan calls for the deployment of 572 American-manufactured Pershing II and cruise missiles in three and perhaps five NATO nations. At the annual ministerial meeting in Brussels December 12-14, 1979, the program won the approval of the members, constituting the most crucial decision in the thirty-one year history of the organization.

Specifically, the scheme involves the basing of 108 Pershing II missiles in West Germany and as many as 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) would be located in Britain, Italy and Belgium, with the possibility of deployment in the Netherlands at a later date. Figure 1 shows the range capabilities and the potential target sites of these missiles.

FIGURE 1



SOURCE: U.S. News and World Report, December 17, 1979, p. 52.

The new missile systems would supplement NATO's current long-range theater nuclear force which consists of British Vulcan bombers, soon to be phased out of the arsenal, and U.S. F-111s. In the event of a crisis, United Kingdom Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and some United States Poseidon SLBMs would be committed to NATO. While these sea-based systems are much less vulnerable, they are not as accurate as land-based missiles, nor as able to perform selective strikes.¹⁵

The Pershing II and the cruise missiles are designed to counter the fifty Soviet Backfire Bombers and as many as 150 intermediate-range SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe.¹⁶ As the sponsor of the program, the U.S. insisted that the modernization was necessary to meet this mounting Soviet threat. If present trends were to continue, NATO strategists predict that the Soviet Union's nuclear and conventional advantage could tempt the Russians to risk war in Europe or attempt a form of blackmail of the European allies.¹⁷

With this understanding of the current status of the NATO Alliance and the significant developments which have affected the organization, it is appropriate now to examine the member country under study and to analyze the contribution made by Italy, a nation where the influence of the Communist Party is momentous.

C. THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

Italy is the fourth largest European NATO country in area, following Turkey, France and Norway,¹⁸ the second

largest in total population after the Federal Republic of Germany, and the fourth largest in total armed forces, after France, West Germany and Turkey.¹⁹ Of the 365,000 military personnel on active duty in Italy, the Army totals 254,000, with the Air Force having 69,000 and the Navy, 42,000.²⁰ While these figures appear small in comparison to those of the United States and West Germany, the Italian contribution is equivalent to that of the Dutch, the Belgians and the other minor allied nations. (See Appendix A for details.)

While Italy's defense structure is designed primarily to protect the homeland, especially the critical northeastern region, the country provides an important strategic geographical position for the NATO Alliance in the Mediterranean. (See map at Appendix B.) Italy guards the choke point between itself and Tunisia. By so doing, it is able to monitor Soviet naval activity and other military and civilian maritime movement in both basins of the sea. The country's unique location also provides for quick movement of naval units to either basin for patrols or training exercises. This geographic significance was one of the primary factors involved in the United States' move to maintain a large defense contingent in Italy. A related issue was the French withdrawal in 1966, when it became necessary to provide alternate locations for various NATO facilities.²¹

On the Italian mainland, Sicily and Sardinia, there are approximately 11,000 U.S. military personnel and 18,000 civilians, including 16,000 dependents.²² (See Appendices

C and D for a listing and location of military installations.) The focus of activity is Naples. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) is headquartered in Naples, along with various other subordinate commands: Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, Naval Striking and Support Forces. (The headquarters for the Allied Land Forces Southern Europe is located in Verona.) While not, as commonly believed the home port of the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet, which is in Norfolk, Virginia, Naples does provide extensive maintenance, repair and logistic support to American naval vessels. The Sixth Fleet flagship, traditionally a guided missile cruiser carrying sophisticated communications equipment, is homeported in Gaeta, north of Naples. Naples is also the operating base for Commander, Task Force 67 (TF-67), responsible for monitoring all shipping in the Mediterranean of interest to the U.S., and Commander, Task Force 69 (TF-69), in charge of the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN) patrolling the waters of the Mediterranean.²³

Maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft operate from the naval air station in Sigonella, Sicily, observing Soviet naval movements throughout the Mediterranean. A submarine tender for the SSNs is anchored off La Maddalena in Sardinia and there are storage and other facilities on the island of San Stefano.²⁴

Two U.S. Army bases are located in Italy. Camp Ederle at Vincenza is the home of two highly mobile fighting units

prepared to deploy to any location in the Mediterranean Sea or in Central Europe. Camp Darby, at Livorno (Leghorn), provides logistic storage and is a command headquarters with hospital and communications facilities. The U.S. Air Force maintains two bases in Italy used as advanced bases for units of the 16th Air Force. These are Aviano and Udine.²⁵

The detail provided on the NATO and U.S. military presence in Italy is of great importance since it should be obvious that the loss of basing rights and facilities in this NATO country, due to a coalition government with Communist participation would strike a serious blow to the NATO Alliance and to U.S. activity in the area. With the precarious situation that exists in Turkey and Greece, a change in the status quo vis-à-vis Italy would cause grave damage to the stability and security of the southern flank. The eastern Mediterranean has witnessed an erosion of its political-military posture. U.S. operations were suspended in Turkey, and Greece withdrew from NATO's integrated command structure. The pro-Western attitudes in this critical region have now dissipated.²⁶ Neither the NATO Alliance nor the United States can afford to have one of its closest members upset the fragile balance any further. Such action would be an open invitation to further unrest and disorder.

D. U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO AND ITALY

Robert Osgood, author of numerous works on NATO, identified U.S. interests in NATO: The Entangling Alliance. In

a more recent writing,²⁷ Osgood lists three interests of primary importance:

(1) The maintenance of an organized allied military force that will deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe, provide our European allies with a confident sense of security, and successfully cope with a military encounter if deterrence should fail.

(2) The maintenance of a harmonious international order among the allies, based on a mutually satisfactory balance of military strength and contributions, particularly with respect to the relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to its European allies and the relationship of the European allies to the United States.

(3) The maintenance of democratic institutions and processes in allied countries as the moral and political basis of collective defense.

Each of these is either directly or indirectly related to the military defense of Western Europe. According to Senators Nunn and Bartlett, "The defense of Europe is our defense ...NATO is the most important of all of America's military alliances...Events on the European continent affect the United States in a way that events in no other part of the world can..."²⁸

The significance of Italy to the United States has been addressed earlier. With regard to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean, various observations can be made. The Mediterranean Sea is the most heavily traveled maritime area in the world, and it provides access to the shortest water route between Europe and the Persian Gulf. The bridges between Europe, Asia and Africa are washed by the Mediterranean

Sea and it probes into the Eurasian continent and its southern heartland via the Black Sea.²⁹

The U.S. has been accused by the Communist Party of Italy of meddling in the internal politics and economy of the country. These denunciations of U.S. interference have hindered American interactions with Italy and other allied nations. Because of the negative image caused by such assertions and actions, the American government abstained from declaring any formal position toward the communists' drive for power. Former Secretary of State Kissinger was outspoken and adamant in his anti-communist stance and he was supported by President Ford at the time.

On January 12, 1978, the Carter administration issued a statement on current U.S. thought relating to West European Communism and the possible rise to power of the Italian Communists in the upcoming elections. Rationale for such a statement stemmed from the U.S. strong desire to counter Italian opinion at the time that the United States was indifferent to the outcome of the elections. The highlights of this foreign policy declaration, considered by some political experts to be direct warnings to the Italians, are worth mentioning:

...our European allies are sovereign countries, and rightly and properly, the decision on how they are governed rests with their citizens alone...We believe we have an obligation to our friends and allies to express our views clearly.

Administration leaders have repeatedly expressed our views on the issue of Communist participation in Western European governments. Our position is clear:

We do not favor such participation and would like to see Communist influence in any Western European country reduced.

The United States and Italy share profound democratic values and interests, and we do not believe that the Communists share those values and interests.³⁰

While the United States recognizes the sovereign nature of the countries of Western Europe, it also realizes the high stakes involved in dealing with the Communists in one of these countries, especially one as essential as Italy. To understand the gravity of the situation, it is necessary to be aware of the defense postures and policies of the PCI.

E. THE MILITARY AND DEFENSE POLICIES OF THE PCI

"Italy out of NATO, NATO out of Italy." This was the manner in which the Italian Communist Party described its policy toward the Alliance. The PCI vehemently opposed Italian membership in NATO and continued its critical stance into the early 1970's. At the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1972, Enrico Berlinguer commented specifically on the Alliance, speaking of "the struggle against the Atlantic Pact," summoning Italy to free itself from "the bond of subordination...to NATO."³¹ Within two years, however, the PCI had developed a new posture on NATO. In December, 1974, the Party Secretary made the following statement in his report to the Central Committee, presenting this "new position":

Insofar as Italy is concerned, we do not pose as a pre-condition Italian withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance...We make it clear that we also believe that the Italian Government must not undertake a unilateral action that would alter the military strategic equilibrium between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.³²

The Italian Communists base their view of NATO on the supposition that East-West détente requires this balance, and that the nation is compelled to remain in the U.S. sphere of influence as a result of her geography, economics and European history. The Communists are also wise enough to realize that a neutralist Italian government, dominated by the PCI, could be confronted with possible reprisals from NATO, U.S. economic and political leverage and political pressures from the Soviet Union. The threat of military intervention by the Soviet Union is another major concern. The PCI accepts NATO to avoid a significant change in the European balance and to further its participation in the government without inducing intervention by the United States.³³ Such an intervention by the Soviet Union causes great concern to the PCI as well.

The attitude of the Italian Communist Party on foreign policy and defense issues has been a major subject of debate by foreign observers. The opinions expressed by these individuals fall into two basic categories. Some experts are skeptical of the PCI's public position on NATO and its autonomy from Moscow, from past performance. However, they feel that the PCI should be encouraged to discuss these subjects to formalize its view. Conversely, there are those who state that the policies of the Italian Communists represent a stimulating new development, perhaps a turning point in the history of the Communist movement. It is the view

of this group that there exist the beginnings of a new strengthened capability of the West European nations to defend themselves. While these groups may express differing views, there is no dissent on the nature and meaning of current PCI policies in this area. It is generally felt that should the PCI come to power, it would not withdraw from the NATO Alliance; would not demand the removal of NATO bases and personnel from national soil; and would not reduce defense expenditures.³⁴ In fact, expanding on this final point, the Communists' voting record in Parliament confirms that the PCI has done nothing to weaken Italy's military capacity. On the contrary, Communist deputies gave strong support to measures calling for a reorganization of the army, enabling it to improve upon its fighting capabilities.³⁵

On the recent issue of modernization of NATO's nuclear weapons arsenal, the PCI voiced a reluctance to accept the basic premise of the missile program: that the growing number of Russian SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe upsets the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Arguing that the Russians have no aggressive intentions and do not want to disturb the balance of power, the PCI voted against the missile program. However, the final Italian vote in NATO at the December 1979 meeting was in support of the nuclear modernization plan.³⁶

While the Italian Communist leaders have stated their intention to continue general support of and participation in the NATO Alliance, there are certain caveats that accompany

these remarks. Writing in the Communist Party newspaper L'Unità, Alberto Jacoviello denounced the Alliance in its current form, stating that it would be unthinkable that Italian Communists would accept the Atlantic Pact, "one of the basic instruments of American interference with the politics and economy of our country..."³⁷ as it now stands.

If the Communists come to power, it is unlikely that there would follow any dramatic shift in foreign policy orientation. It is worth recalling that Party Secretary Berlinguer went out of his way at the East Berlin Communist conference to inform the participants that the PCI would act "within the framework of the international alliances to which our country belongs."³⁸ Of more profound significance was his remarkable statement in an interview prior to the June 1976 elections, when he declared that the PCI would "feel more secure" under the protection of NATO. This statement was the PCI's first public recognition that the national security interests of Italy were best served by membership in NATO.³⁹ Berlinguer was inferring that it would be easier to build pluralist socialism under the umbrella of NATO. Further, the PCI is deeply concerned with possible Soviet intervention in Italy.

The PCI is inclined to accept NATO on two conditions: "that there should be no unilateral changes in the actual balance of power in Europe, another direct reference to the importance of *détente*, and that the rapport between Western

Europe and the two superpowers be revised."⁴⁰ The Italian Communists feel strongly on these two points, noting that, "the ultimate objective of such revision must be...the overcoming of the opposing military and political blocs."⁴¹ The PCI has acknowledged that the Atlantic Alliance must exist as long as there is a Warsaw Pact. Yet, the Italian Communists are equally emphatic when they state that NATO must be "restructured to break the American hegemony, permitting the European members to reestablish their sovereignty."⁴² It is interesting to observe the use of "hegemony", a term often associated with the Soviet Union. The PCI does not consider the USSR a threat to Europe, but it does have very strong negative feelings toward the U.S. It feels that the real dangers to Italy are U.S. imperialistic ways, as elements of disruption and instability. Keenly opposed to such imperialism (i.e., U.S. military-industrial complex, which determines Italian military policy, corrupt business practices of the Americans, politico-economic conditioning opposed to unity in Europe, etc.), the Italian Communists, while exploiting events to their advantage, see the spread of decadence and decline in Europe as caused by U.S. supremacy.⁴³

Party leader Berlinguer has expressed his views on the armed forces of the country. In a report to the Central Committee in preparation for the Fourteenth Congress of the PCI, he noted that the Party had long since outgrown its anti-military attitudes. Italy needs organized, efficient

armed forces to guarantee security and national independence. He stated that the orientation and organization of the Army, Navy and Air Force should be in line with constitutional principles, that the military cannot be subject to partisan manipulation. While calling for continued compulsory military service, Berlinguer highlighted the need for improvements in promotions and appointments of personnel. He emphasized that military spending must be planned to avoid waste and duplication.⁴⁴

It is interesting to analyze the depth and completeness of Berlinguer's speech with regard to the military. The Communists have gone from an active anti-defense, anti-military posture to one of active interest in the national defense. The PCI continues to amaze the Italian people by its unique changes in policy, such as the shift from anti- to pro-NATO, thereby gaining additional support. In addition, the latest decision against the nuclear modernization program for NATO is yet another example of the changing of views on defense issues.

In order to analyze any effect the Italian Communists in government would have on the North Atlantic Alliance, it is necessary to understand the likelihood of the PCI coming to power. Various factors are involved in determining the possibility of such action. These now will be addressed with a view toward appreciating the significance of this event should it occur. The consequences of the PCI in governmental

power can be comprehended only when one is aware of the structure of the Italian Parliament, realizing the organizational framework of the legislature and the importance of the numerous positions and ministerial posts. Further, the recent electoral results will be discussed and analyzed as an indicator of the future strengths and weaknesses of the Italian Communist Party.

V. LIKELIHOOD OF PCI IN POWER

A. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ITALY

Italy is plagued by a progressive deterioration of its political, economic, administrative and social institutions. It is this decadence that has aided the Italian Communists in their quest for power in that they have capitalized on the weaknesses of the current government. By presenting attractive alternatives to rescue the nation from continued economic and political chaos, the PCI has gained the valuable support of a large segment of the electorate. The Italian Communists propose economic measures to curtail inflation, increase productivity and develop more sophisticated technology while advocating greater political access and involvement in the political process, increasing economic efficiency with a broadly based political system.¹

To understand the present economic crisis, it is useful to examine the Italian economy in the post-war period. Considered an "economic miracle," the growth in Italy's economy during the 1950's and early 1960's was unquestionably impressive, rising at an annual rate of almost 6 percent, compared to the 4.5 percent average of Western Europe.² There were substantial gains in the GNP as well, which doubled in the twelve year period between 1950 and 1962,³ with the volume of imports more than doubled and exports nearly trebled.⁴ Indeed, Italy was quickly acquiring those

characteristics of a highly advanced industrial society: a steady growth of output, greater social mobility, modernization of economic structures, a higher standard of living, and a shift of labor from the agricultural regions to the industrial centers. A feeling of prosperity and good fortune was evident throughout the country.⁵

In recent years, the nation's economy has deteriorated from the prosperity experienced two decades ago. There are many factors that have contributed to the current condition. Notable is the soaring cost of labor which produces inflationary wage levels for Italy's industrial workers. According to Claire Sterling, the wildcat strikes of 1969, when over twelve million workers were on strike between September and December, severely crippled the government controlled industries, causing near panic. The result was enormously increased labor costs which became a primary factor in Italy's economic upheaval.⁶

While labor costs have been a chief contributor, other elements have hindered economic recovery. Giorgio Napolitano, a member of the Directorate of the PCI with responsibility for economic policy and social affairs, said that Italy's difficulties stem from the manner in which the country has been governed in the past, both before and after the 1968 shift to the left. Highlighting various aspects prior to that year, Napolitano includes corruption within the program for urban land speculation, a mistaken use of resources and

a growing imbalance between the northern and southern sectors of the country. Since 1968, the troubles have deepened with the intense wage push of 1970, the ramifications of the 1973 oil crisis, a massive increase in public spending and a general slackening of discipline within all areas of democratic life, a permissive trend with dangerous consequences, according to Napolitano.⁷

To the list can also be added high levels of inflation and unemployment, an unfavorable balance of payments, low industrial productivity, fiscal and financial scandals within the bureaucracy and an excessive government budget deficit. Each is an upsetting problem for any country, but, when combined, as in Italy, the affect can be catastrophic.

Not only is Italy burdened with economic anarchy, but it is also faced with socio-cultural problems which dilute domestic stability. From this country of small sovereign units have come major contributions to European art, culture and society. Historically, however, these sovereign entities have hindered Italy in the development of a national identity upon which sound, collective values should be based. In addition, the public and private sectors which managed economic growth have failed to assist in the transformation of the quasi-feudal social structure into one more compatible with an industrialized economy and its concomitant conditions. Thus, there has been a dismembering of Italy's traditional society and massive migrations have further upset the social

fabric of the country, causing a precarious coexistence of social groups and classes. Related to these are the appalling conditions within the large cities: overcrowding of schools, inadequate transportation systems and severe shortages of satisfactory housing. Scanning this social morass, one can understand the deep socio-cultural malaise that is widespread in Italy.⁸

The Italian educational system needs immediate reform. Archaic objectives and procedures are still employed in the schools and universities. Lacking is an efficient modern system of professional training as well as relief from the chaotic development of the educational institutions, with little updating of structures or procedures.⁹ Since 1969, Italy has witnessed serious student unrest and massive sit-in demonstrations. Frequent confrontations have occurred between students and the authorities and even between student factions. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where the student agitations of the 1960's have become a permanent event.¹⁰

Perhaps the most frightening of all the factors which have led to social instability in Italy is the outbreak of rampant terrorism which has spread across the nation. Just as the economic problems of the country have been attributed to the inefficiency of the government, terrorism has become linked to politics. From the "kneecap" attacks on journalists, judicial officials and others to the outright execution of a

major political leader, the radical groups in Italy exert a formidable influence on the country.

While reform and rejuvenation of the present political environment may not resolve the problems, there is a definite need for a change of leadership. With the DC in majority control for the past three decades, many experts believe that its continued inefficiency and inability to cope with the ills of the nation would lead only to further disintegration. Corruption and scandals within the party elite are common. Lawrence Gray, writing in Problems of Communism, notes the deficiencies in the Center-Left Government which ruled Italy for fifteen years until 1976. It was comprised of the DC, the Socialists and minor parties. Gray notes that these deficiencies can be aggregated into: (1) disunity and constant factional strife within the coalition government, and (2) an incapability to handle the consequences of disorderly and uneven growth that resulted in runaway inflation and an economic recession.¹¹

"Pragmatism, not ideological purity, lies at the heart of PCI thinking."¹² R.E.M. Irving, an authority on European internal policy matters, continues that with such a political policy, the Italian Communists have accepted compromises and coalitions as the best means of achieving power. A party with a long and consistent record of commitment to pluralism and to the Italian road to socialism, the PCI has emphasized the need to accommodate itself to cultural and religious traditions of Italy and Western Europe as a whole.¹³


Following the lead of Antonio Gramsci, the ideological mentor of the party, the PCI has realized the necessity of a compromise between the Communists and the Catholic Church; hence, "the historic compromise" of 1974. As discussed earlier, Party Secretary Berlinguer proposed this alliance of the DC and the PCI in order to form a broad and lasting political base on which to govern the country. While neither of the two parties can hope to govern alone, "the historic compromise" has yet to be accepted. However, it could prove to be a possible solution to Italy's current dilemma.

To comprehend the effects of the PCI in political power, it is necessary to understand the Italian governmental structure as well as the constitutional features of the Parliament.

B. STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

While Italian history dates back thousands of years, the Republic of Italy is less than thirty-five years old. The Constitution was drafted by the elected deputies to the first Constituent Assembly and ratified on December 22, 1947. Following promulgation five days later, the Constitution took effect on January 1, 1948.¹⁴

The Italian Republic parallels in some respects other West European parliamentary democracies in its structure. Figure 2 illustrates the three-branch governmental organization of the Republican state. In theory, the executive branch with its Council of Ministers is responsible to the legislature and is composed of members of the legislature,



ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE
SOURCE: Area Handbook for Italy, 1977

Figure 2

although this is not a constitutional requirement. There is a president whose position is above that of the regular governmental structure. However, the Italian political system operates in a manner unique to the country. Particular aspects include the lawmaking power of the parliamentary committees and the fact that "governments are responsible, though unofficially, to extraparlimentary political parties rather than to the legislature."¹⁵

The Parliament of Italy is a bicameral body consisting of a Senate (Senato) and a Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei deputati). There are 315 senators and 630 deputies, both popularly elected at least every five years through slightly different but basically proportional electoral systems. Specifically, the Chamber of Deputies utilizes multimember electoral colleges and seats are allocated proportionally by party list. Senate colleges are single-member in composition and seats are consigned proportionally in regional colleges. The exception to this latter procedure is the case of a candidate receiving 65 percent of the votes, a very rare occurrence.¹⁶

The Council of Ministers is legally responsible to both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. After formation by nomination of the President of the Republic, the Council must acquire a vote of confidence from each chamber within ten days. Further, the cabinet can come to an end in one of three manners: (1) by resigning on its own initiative,

(2) by resigning if it loses a vote of confidence in either chamber, or (3) when parliament is dissolved for new elections.¹⁷

The loss of a vote in one of the chambers on a bill it has proposed does not constitute the overthrow of that cabinet. A specific motion of no confidence must be submitted signed by at least one-third of the members of either the Senate or the Chamber. A further stipulation requires that the motion cannot be acted upon until three days after its presentation. Such action prevents the overthrow of a government by "sudden death", thereby prohibiting the opposition from taking advantage of a possible temporary absence from the floor of the cabinet's supporters or their temporary dissension.¹⁸

The Chamber of Deputies is generally thought to be the more prestigious of the two bodies. Constitutionalists argue that party leaders prefer the Chamber to the Senate and that there is a tendency to choose the Prime Minister and the more significant ministers from the Chamber rather than from the Senate. Furthermore, they claim that governments consider votes of no confidence in the Chamber more seriously than in the Senate. While there is some truth to these arguments, specific cases have been cited to show the contrary.¹⁹ In addition, as both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies share basically identical legislative powers,²⁰ one of the few European legislatures to state such a claim, the distinction of prestige of one house over the other is conceptually artificial.

The powers of the Italian Parliament are conventional in nature: the passage of laws, the ratification of treaties, the approval of the national budget, the delegation of rule-making power to the cabinet and the conduct of investigations. Certain additional powers involve the joint session of the Parliament: election of the president of the Republic, impeachment of cabinet members for crimes committed in the exercise of their functions, election of one-third of the members of the Constitutional Court, election of one-third of the twenty-one elected members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary and election of sixteen additional judges to serve on the Constitutional Court in the event of impeachment of a president.²¹

There is almost no limit to what Parliament can act upon. It sets its own internal rules with the president of each branch determining the agenda for that branch and assigning bills to its standing committees. For the government to achieve priority for its bills, it must first influence these presidents and the chairmen of the committees. Both houses are organized into standing committees, each corresponding to the various areas covered by the different ministerial departments. (See Figure 2 for the complete listing of these departments.) There are fourteen standing committees in the Chamber and eleven in the Senate. Each legislator is a member of at least one and generally not more than one committee. Membership is determined by experience and alleged competence of the legislators, with ex-ministers on committees

relating to the subject matter of their former ministry. These individuals often serve as chairmen.²² In addition to standing committees, each house has an election committee, a rules committee and a library committee.

In procedure, bills may be introduced by the government, from the other house, by an individual member of the Parliament or by initiative. When a bill is passed to a standing committee, three types of procedures may be followed in handling that bill; the committee may act as (1) an advisory body, (2) a legislative body or (3) a drafting body. The president of the particular house reviewing the bill will determine in which capacity the committee is to function on the legislation.²³

The members of the Chamber and the Senate vote in party groups. The group spokesman of a particular issue will conclude debate on a bill by declaring how his party group will vote. This form of discipline has not been imposed by the group caucus but by the party organization outside parliament, and is enforced by these organizations. On almost all issues of foreign and domestic policy, legislators follow the party decision. When there have been rare ruptures of discipline, the offending parliamentarian must come before the party control commission or similar group for judgment and determination of punishment. The latter could range from a reprimand to expulsion from the party, with there being varying intermediate penalties.²⁴

Legislative output of the Italian Parliament is in absolute terms very high and in relative terms substantially higher than other West European legislatures. When compared with that of West Germany, the results are surprising. In the first West German Parliament (1949-1953) 545 bills were passed as against 2317 in the first Parliament of Italy (1948-1953); and 497 and 424 compared with 1897 and 1797 in their respective second and third parliaments. The number was still significant in the fourth Italian Parliament at 1767.²⁵

While Italian legislation tends to be confused, fragmentary and conflicting, the exceedingly high productivity level would be impossible without the recourse to legislation by committee as both houses spend less than 20 percent of their time in plenary session on legislation. Furthermore, 75 percent of all legislation passes in committee with 90 percent passing with unanimous support.²⁶

While this discussion of the Italian governmental and parliamentary system does not address all the detailed procedures, it does highlight the significance of the legislative branch within the total framework. One can note that by authorizing a lawmaking power to the parliamentary committees, these committees and their chairmen hold influential positions within the governmental structure. Further, the Italian Communists, in recognition of their electoral strength following the 1976 national elections, were given the post of

Chamber President and chairs of seven committees, truly an unprecedented action.

C. THE COMMUNIST VOTER

When compared with other West European Communist Parties, the PCI is a success story for Communist electoral politics. In Southern Europe, the Communists have established themselves as an important party of the left, notwithstanding the fact that Communists are well behind the PSOE in Spain and the Socialists in Portugal, while only marginally behind the Socialists in France. In Italy, however, the Communists are ahead of the nearest left party by a significant margin.²⁷ Table 4 illustrates the rise in the PCI's popular vote at every general election since World War II, less the latest election.

TABLE 4
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY POPULAR VOTE
GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1946-1979

| Year | PCI Vote | % of Total |
|------------------------|------------|------------|
| June 1946 | 4,356,686 | 19.0 |
| June 1953 | 6,120,809 | 22.6 |
| May 1958 | 6,704,454 | 22.7 |
| April 1963 | 7,763,854 | 25.3 |
| May 1968 | 8,557,404 | 26.9 |
| May 1972 | 9,085,927 | 27.2 |
| June 1976 | 12,620,502 | 34.4 |
| June 1979 ^a | 11,107,883 | 30.4 |

^aInformation from FBIS, No. 109 (5 June 1979), p. L-1.

SOURCE (except 1979): Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler, 'Eurocommunism' Implications for East and West (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 22.

It is beneficial to be aware of the character of the Italian Communist voter prior to discussing the details of the latest elections. Three representative indicators are sex, age and occupation. Whereas Annie Kriegel reports an increase in the percentage of female membership of the French Communist Party between 1966 and 1972,²⁸ there is little evidence to show any major increase in women's membership within the PCI. Their representation has remained relatively static over the past five years at approximately 23 percent.²⁹ While the Italian Communists have campaigned for women's rights (i.e., referendum on divorce in 1974 and liberalization of abortion laws in 1976), they have been careful not to alienate themselves from issues relating to the Catholic Church and the sanctity of family life. All in all, the Italian Communist Party, like the other Communist and leftist parties in Western Europe, remains overwhelming male in membership.³⁰

On the subject of age, Neil McInnes notes that, between the two world wars, the West European Communist Parties in general were regularly younger than the corresponding socialist parties. He further states that the 1960's saw the Communists overtaken on their left by those younger than they.³¹ The age of the Communist electorates has dropped considerably, especially with the passage in the Spring, 1975 of the new law lowering the age limit for voting from twenty-five to eighteen. The Italian scholar, Giacomo Sani, partially attributes the electoral success of the PCI in 1976 to this

lowering of the age limit. These "new electors" constituted between 2.0 and 2.2 million votes of the total 12.6 million won by the PCI and corresponds to 38 to 42 percent of all the ballots cast by this group of voters. Sani states that "there is little doubt that this [younger voter] was an important component of the PCI's advance."³² Table 5 represents the results of a study showing the significance of age with regard to support for the Italian Communist Party.

TABLE 5

SUPPORT FOR THE PCI IN
DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS, 1975^a

| Age in 1975 | Percentage Favoring the PCI | Number of Cases |
|----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| 65 and over | 17.4 | 132 |
| 55-64 | 23.6 | 178 |
| 45-54 | 25.6 | 281 |
| 35-44 | 27.5 | 258 |
| 25-34 | 41.1 | 265 |
| 20-24 | 43.5 | 407 |
| 18-19 | 47.5 | 181 |
| 16-17 | 52.0 | 150 |
| All age groups | 35.5 | 1,852 |

^aData from the Sartori-Marradi survey (1975)

SOURCE: Giacomo Sani, "Mass Support for Italian Communism," Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori, eds., Euro-communism: The Italian Case (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 91.

The Italian Communist Party has been and remains a predominantly working-class party. Notwithstanding this fact, the growth of the PCI has been diffused among several social classes and the party continually strives to recruit members from the middle classes and the professionals. During the past twenty years, the social composition of the Italian Communist electorate has become more heterogeneous, drawing voters from various social strata. The occupational composition of the party membership is depicted in Table 6.

TABLE 6

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF PCI MEMBERSHIP
1960 AND 1973

| Social Strata | 1960 | 1973 |
|---|------|-------|
| Industrial workers | 37.4 | 41.05 |
| Agricultural laborers | 15.5 | 6.25 |
| Peasants | 18.0 | 7.0 |
| Artisans, shopkeepers, small businessmen | 5.9 | 8.4 |
| Clerks and technicians | 1.9 | 4.2 |
| Professionals, intellectuals, teachers | 0.6 | 1.4 |
| Students | 0.3 | 1.6 |
| Homemakers | 14.1 | 12.3 |
| Pensioners | | 16.75 |
| Others } | 6.3 | 1.03 |

SOURCE: Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 261.

D. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS - 1976 AND 1979

"The June, 1976, national elections demonstrated unequivocally the end of the center-left formula that had ruled Italy for almost 15 years."³³ According to Pellegrino Nazzaro, the results of the election made it clear that the country could no longer be governed without the Communist Party. Such a development in the political proceedings of the nation merits careful consideration and analysis as it proved that "in Italy democracy is no longer possible through the formula of keeping half a nation in power and half in opposition."³⁴

The electoral climate surrounding the 1976 elections was exceedingly tense. In his analysis of the parliamentary elections, Joseph LaPalombara writes in Italy at the Polls that a number of factors contributed to the sense of foreboding that many in Italy and abroad expressed about the elections.³⁵ Among these factors was the economic crisis with the unemployment level unmatched since the early 1950's and skyrocketing inflation surpassing the 20 percent mark. The balance of payments was so out of line that the Italian lira was sliding toward record lows. The rate of Italian economic growth was one of the lowest in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Italy's internal production, consumption and monetary and fiscal patterns were very disturbing to other countries and financial institutions. These economic ills received broad coverage in the news media, with three observations appearing evident to the Italians:

(1) the government showed signs of being unable or unwilling to cope with the crisis; (2) the trade unions refused to accept economic regeneration measures whose burden would fall mostly on the working class; and (3) the Communist Party appeared to be the only major political party with the will and the power to move into this economic morass.³⁶

Other factors causing the tense atmosphere were rampant political scandals, radicalization with escalated terrorist attacks and indiscriminate bombings and the basic failure of measures of reform and renewal.³⁷ While political scandals have long been a staple of Italian politics, they rose to frightening levels in the 1970's. Neither the government, the military, nor political parties, to mention a few, were immune to the spread of scandals and corruption. The prime example of the extent of these scandals is the direct involvement of President Leone in the Lockheed Corporation pay-off. The acceptance of large sums of money to induce the sale of aircraft to the government led to Leone's resignation in June, 1978.

A final and certainly not the least significant factor affecting the electoral climate was the possibility that the PCI would come to power.³⁸ While the 1972 elections showed that prospect to be quite remote (i.e., the Communists received less than 30 percent of the vote for the lower chamber), the results confirmed several interesting patterns. First, while there were more than ten political parties in Italy in 1972, two of these groups, the PCI and the DC,

accumulated approximately two-thirds of the vote, thus resulting in a basically two-party system. A second observation showed that the PCI continued its slow but linear rise in electoral appeal. While the PCI had the majority of its voter support in the northern and central regions thirty years ago, the 1972 results showed a broadening of its electoral following to other areas of the country. Table 7 highlights the regional voting pattern for the PCI in the elections of 1946, 1972 and 1976.

TABLE 7

ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE
FOR CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1946, 1972, 1976
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

| Region | PCI Vote (in percentages) | | | Difference 1976 over 1946 (in percentage points) |
|---------|------------------------------|------|------|---|
| | 1946 | 1972 | 1976 | |
| North | 22.4 | 26.5 | 33.5 | 11.1 |
| Central | 24.7 | 34.4 | 41.4 | 16.7 |
| South | 10.8 | 24.4 | 32.4 | 21.6 |
| Islands | 10.2 | 22.2 | 29.5 | 19.3 |

SOURCE: Joseph LaPalombara, "Italian Elections as Hobson's Choice," Howard R. Penniman, ed. Italy at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 10.

A third pattern which developed was the apparent growing electoral schism between the PCI and the Socialist parties, the latter being the Proletarian Socialists, the Socialist Party itself and the Democratic Socialists. This tendency of the Communists to capture larger and larger proportions of the left vote caused consternation among many Italians. Just as the PCI has improved its position relative to the voting public, the PSI has suffered a calamitous decline in electoral support. Those Italians who fear the growth of the left are all the more dismayed as it is the Communist component that is growing.³⁹

With the dissolution of the Parliament in April, 1976, President Leone called for national elections June 20-21. The campaign centered on the strategies of the Christian Democrats and the Communists. The DC, led by party chairman Benigno Zaccagnini, put forward a 14-point platform ranging from socioeconomic reforms to international commitments. However, the heart of the platform focused on the possibility of Communist participation in post-election government coalitions. Although the Christian Democrats opposed a government including all parties of the constitutional spectrum, they especially objected to the Communists sharing cabinet seats. Their hope was for the Communists to agree to a formal role in shaping policy from outside.⁴⁰

The main emphasis of the PCI's campaign strategy focused on its role in Italy. It claimed to be "the only genuine

expression of the popular and working classes."⁴¹ While criticizing the Christian Democrats and their abstract way of managing the political process and problems, the PCI advocated efficiency and good government, with a party slogan of "serving in the government to serve the people."⁴² The party platform called for a post-election government of "national emergency" including all parties. Party leader Berlinguer voiced opposition to a Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition government. This statement produced further loss of credibility and political prestige to the already suffering Socialist Party.

The outcome of the 1976 election produced a strong polarization of votes for the two major parties with the DC losing 0.1 percent of the votes and four seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the Senate, they gained 0.8 percent but lost one seat. It was the Communists who scored the biggest victories. They jumped from 27.1 percent and 179 seats in 1972 to 34.4 percent and 228 seats in the Chamber. The PCI gains carried over into the Senate with an increase from 27.6 percent and 94 seats in 1972 to 33.8 percent of the vote and 116 seats.⁴³ To gain a clear understanding of the status of each party and its electoral support, Table 8 shows the breakdown for the general elections of 1972 and 1976 by political party and parliamentary house. The comparison of the two election year results illustrates the substantial gain made by the Communist Party. The figures also

RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1972 AND 1976 BY PARTY

| Party ^a | Votes | Percent | Seats | Votes | Percent | Seats |
|----------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|---------|------------------|
| Chamber of Deputies: | | | | | | |
| DC | 12,912,466 | 38.7 | 266 | 14,211,005 | 38.7 | 262 |
| PCI | 9,068,961 | 27.1 | 179 | 12,620,509 | 34.4 | 228 |
| PSI | 3,208,597 | 9.6 | 61 | 3,541,383 | 9.6 | 57 |
| MSI-DN | 2,894,862 | 8.7 | 56 | 2,243,849 | 6.1 | 35 |
| PSDI (PSU) | 1,718,142 | 5.1 | 29 | 1,237,483 | 3.4 | 15 |
| PLI | 1,296,977 | 3.9 | 20 | 478,157 | 1.3 | 5 |
| PRI | 954,357 | 2.8 | 15 | 1,134,648 | 3.1 | 14 |
| SVP | 153,674 | 0.5 | 3 | 184,286 | 0.5 | 3 |
| Other | ---b | 3.6 | 1 | ---b | 2.9 | 11 |
| Senate: | | | | | | |
| DC | 11,465,529 | 38.1 ^c | 135 | 12,215,036 | 38.9 | 135 ^c |
| PCI | 8,573,662 | 28.4 ^c | 95 ^c | 10,631,871 | 33.8 | 116 |
| PSI | 3,225,707 | 10.7 | 33 | 3,208,382 | 10.2 | 29 |
| MSI-DN | 2,767,059 | 9.2 | 26 | 2,088,318 | 6.6 | 15 |
| PSDI (PSU) | 1,613,810 | 5.4 | 11 | 965,478 | 3.1 | 6 |
| PLI | 1,316,172 | 4.1 | 8 | 436,506 | 1.4 | 2 |
| PRI | 918,440 | 3.0 | 5 | 845,629 | 2.7 | 6 |
| SVP | 113,452 | 0.4 | 2 | 158,605 | 0.5 | 2 |
| Other | ---b | 0.7 | 0 | ---b | 2.9 | 4 |

^aDC-Christian Democratic Party; PCI-Italian Communist Party; PSI-Italian Socialist Party; MSI-DN-Italian Social Movement-National Right; PSDI (PSU) - Italian Social Democratic Party, known as PSU-Unitary Socialist Party, between 1969-1974; PLI-Italian Liberal Party; PRI-Italian Republican Party; SVP-South Tyrolean Popular Party.

^bInsufficient Data.

^cFigures differ, according to source quoted earlier in text.

SOURCE: Area Handbook of Italy, 1977, p. 209.

point out the fact that the smaller parties, especially the PSDI and MSI-DN, suffered substantial losses.

Robert Putnum, writing in International Organization, analyzed the Italian political scene and presented three reasons to support his theory that the thirty-year period of exclusion of the PCI from a formal role in national decision making is drawing to a close. He stated that this transformation of Italian politics is likely to continue for the following reasons:⁴⁴

(1) the electoral trends that strengthened the PCI's hand reflect not merely passing gusts of government unpopularity, but more fundamental transformation of patterns of partisanship and social mobilization,

(2) at all levels within the Italian political and economic elites, barriers to collaboration with the Communists have dramatically declined in the last several years, and

(3) solving Italy's grave economic problems - immense government deficits, unsustainable labor costs, severe underinvestment and structural rigidities and distortions - will require painful sacrifices that are possible politically only for a government with broad popular and parliamentary support. Without PCI forbearance, Italy would rapidly become ungovernable.

Following the 1976 elections, the Italian people were looking for a political system that would include the working masses without regard to ideological differences. The Christian Democrats felt driven to re-examine national priorities, placing more importance on urgent social and economic problems rather than on the ideological differences that had caused the confrontation with the Communists. In like manner, the Communists needed to reassure larger sectors

of the population that they would respect Italian democracy as promised.⁴⁵ For seventeen months after the June, 1976 elections, the Communists refrained from voting against the government. In December 1977, Berlinguer threatened to force a general election unless the PCI were given posts in a "government of national emergency." In March, 1978, the Communists were allowed to vote in the parliamentary elections, rather than just abstaining from voting against. However, the PCI continued its drive for active and direct participation in the Cabinet of the Andreotti government. The Communists withdrew their support of the government in January, 1979. After unsuccessful attempts at forming another government, the parliament was dissolved in April, 1979, with new national elections scheduled for June 3-4. While there was no real winner in those elections, there was a loser: the Communist Party. The PCI support of the Christian Democratic government between 1976 and 1979 may have contributed to its defeat. The effects of that period of responsibility without power were severely felt by the Communists: the party's membership dropped by 24,000 in 1978; local elections registered major swings away from the Communists; and pre-election political opinion polls predicted that the Radical Party and the far-left Proletarian Democracy Party would gather the support of disillusioned Communist idealists.⁴⁶

Predictions were accurate in that the PCI lost 4.0 percent of the votes won in 1976. In addition, it lost 19 seats

in the Chamber of Deputies. Losses were suffered in the industrialized north, especially in Turin, where the party lost 8.0 percent of its previous support. In the south, especially in Naples, the loss was 8.0 percent from the last election. The losses were heavy in the Chamber, with its minimum voting age of 18, indicating an Italian youth sector somewhat disenchanted with the Communist Party line.⁴⁴

Table 9 presents the final results of the general election of 1979, showing the votes accumulated by each of the parties, the percent and the number of seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. It is interesting to compare these gains and losses with the outcome in the 1976 election, also shown in Table 9.

With this background of the current political atmosphere in Italy and the understanding of the likelihood of the PCI gaining a position of power in the government, it is logical to analyze the effects of Eurocommunism, notably Italian Communism, on the NATO Alliance. The effects are varied with some proving to be more adverse than others. Each deserves individual analysis considering the significance of the subject and the alternatives available to the NATO Alliance and the United States.

RESULTS OF THE 1976 AND 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS

| Party | 1976 | | | 1979 | | |
|----------------------|------------|---------|-------|------------|---------|-------|
| | Votes | Percent | Seats | Votes | Percent | Seats |
| Chamber of Deputies | | | | | | |
| DC | 14,211,005 | 38.7 | 262 | 14,007,594 | 38.3 | 262 |
| PCI | 12,620,509 | 34.4 | 228 | 11,107,883 | 30.4 | 201 |
| PSI | 3,541,383 | 9.6 | 57 | 3,586,256 | 9.8 | 62 |
| MSI-DN | 2,243,849 | 6.1 | 35 | 1,924,251 | 5.3 | 30 |
| PSDI (PSU) | 1,237,483 | 3.4 | 15 | 1,403,873 | 3.8 | 20 |
| PLI | 478,157 | 1.3 | 5 | 1,259,362 | 3.4 | 18 |
| PRI | 1,134,648 | 3.1 | 14 | 708,022 | 1.9 | 9 |
| SVP | 184,286 | 0.5 | 3 | 501,431 | 1.4 | 6 |
| Other | --- | 2.9 | 11 | 293,443 | 0.8 | --- |
| | | | | 228,340 | 0.6 | --- |
| | | | | 206,264 | 0.06 | 4 |
| | | | | 33,250 | 0.1 | 1 |
| | | | | 135,124 | 0.4 | 1 |
| Senate | | | | | | |
| DC | 12,215,036 | 38.9 | 135 | 12,001,969 | 38.3 | 138 |
| PCI | 10,631,871 | 33.8 | 116 | 9,851,437 | 31.5 | 109 |
| PSI | 3,208,382 | 10.2 | 29 | 3,251,678 | 10.4 | 32 |
| MSI-DN | 2,088,318 | 6.6 | 15 | 1,781,341 | 5.7 | 13 |
| PSDI (PSU) | 965,478 | 3.1 | 6 | 1,320,351 | 4.2 | 9 |
| PLI | 436,506 | 1.4 | 2 | 1,051,699 | 3.4 | 6 |
| PRI | 845,629 | 2.7 | 6 | 691,514 | 2.2 | 2 |
| SVP | 158,605 | 0.5 | 2 | 413,217 | 1.3 | 2 |
| Other | --- | 2.9 | 4 | 176,857 | 0.6 | 0 |
| | | | | 44,082 | 0.1 | 0 |

^aPR-Radical Party; POUP-Democratic Proletarian Unity Party; NSU-United New Left; DN-National Democracy; PPST-Popular Tyrol Party.

^bNumber of seats indistinct.

SOURCE: Area Handbook for Italy, 1977, p. 209 for 1976 and FBIS, Western Europe (5 June 1979), p. L1, No. 109 for 1979.

VI. EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON NATO

A spectral analysis of the ways in which Eurocommunism, and specifically the participation in government of the Italian Communist Party, could affect the North Atlantic Alliance reveals several interesting aspects. From one end of the spectrum with no effect on NATO, one can trace the options to the extreme end with Italy out of NATO.

This chapter presents a variety of effects, postulated by others, of PCI accession to power on the NATO Alliance. The views of the author are reserved to the concluding portion of this work.

To study specific effects, it is necessary to discuss the various elements involved and the options available. Some are more damaging than others with limited acceptability under unique circumstances while others are minimal in severity, causing only slight disturbance to the member nations of NATO. An appreciation of this degree of variance will enable one to understand more fully the depth of the situation and the options that can be employed to resolve any potential difficulty.

A. EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO

PCI participation in government could affect the NATO Alliance and related U.S. interests in a variety of ways. The presence of Communists in positions of influence and

authority in Italy could affect its defense contributions and policies toward NATO. The amount of government funds dedicated to the Alliance has been decreasing recently in some allied countries as well as in Italy. Should the PCI attain power, this defense contribution could be altered. This subject was addressed in more detail in an earlier section when PCI defense policies were analyzed.

Another effect of PCI participation in government,¹ one that warrants careful consideration, is the anticipated response of allies with Communists in power or participating in the government to Soviet aggression against other members of the Alliance, or against neighboring countries such as Yugoslavia. At a press conference in June 1976 and again in 1979, PCI leader Berlinguer was asked what the response would be of the Communist ministers in the Italian government to a conflict in the Mediterranean and the use of Italian territory by NATO or Warsaw Pact forces as a support and supply base for naval and air units. Berlinguer's response was more ambiguous than definitive. He stated that the foremost duty of the Italian government should be to work actively toward preventing the possibility of the conflict. He continued by explaining that, in his opinion, any such conflict could signify the outbreak of a general nuclear war. Then, there would be no problem because this would lead to the destruction of mankind. Therefore, the real problem lies in prevention.² In the event of a conflict in Europe involving the Soviets, the Italian Communists have consistently stressed

the depth of the PCI's commitment to NATO, while emphasizing the fact that the question is purely hypothetical. While not asserting the inevitability of a nuclear war, as in the previous scenario, the PCI leaders state that, with détente, an East-West military conflict in Europe is practically impossible.³ However, the recent events in Afghanistan may unsettle this PCI certainty.

The participation of the PCI in Italy's government may affect the U.S. military role in NATO, especially the stationing of American armed forces on the European continent and the U.S. use of naval and air bases. The United States maintains sizeable military and civilian forces in Italy. With the PCI in control of the country, there is the possibility that these personnel could be ousted should Italy decide to sever its ties with the NATO Alliance. Although this option is unlikely, there is always the chance that conditions could change based on Italian Communist statements regarding continued participation in NATO.

Linked to this possible consequence of PCI participation in government is U.S. military and economic support to Italy. There had been substantial and consistent financial assistance given to the Christian Democratic government since World War II, primarily to keep the Communist Party out of the ruling administration. While this aid from the United States has been declining lately, there has been an increase in assistance from the European Economic Community. Were the Italian

Communist Party to gain power in a future government, it would be difficult to convince the American public and the Congress to continue a policy of financial support to Communist Italy. Withholding such funds would injure the sickly economy of Italy, but the presence of an influential Communist Party would be upsetting to the United States and its allied nations.

The military balance and politically cohesive structure of NATO would be effected by Communists holding key offices in the Italian government. The NATO Alliance is based on a policy of mutual trust, respect and understanding toward other member nations. Were one of the group to allow the control of the country by a Communist party which supported the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was dominated by the Soviet Union, the others would think that their national security and the unity and cohesion of the Alliance as a defense structure were in jeopardy. The PCI shows no direct signs of being controlled by the Russians. Rather it professes democratic principles and may not be as threatening as a more pro-Soviet Communist Party, such as the PCF and its recent actions.

The effects of Eurocommunism discussed here resemble the main issues raised by the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in his first major foreign policy address after leaving office. Analyzing the ramifications of Communist accession to power in allied governments, Kissinger offered four significant consequences.⁴ First, the character of the

Alliance would become confused to the American people and; Kissinger contends, over time, the participation of the Communists will undermine the moral and political basis for U.S. troop deployment in Western Europe. The American people would be asked to continue their support of and commitment to the NATO Alliance on the basis of two highly uncertain, untested assumptions: "that there is a new trend of Communism which will in time split from Moscow, and that the West will be able to manipulate the new divisions to its advantage."⁵

A second consequence is the effect of Eurocommunism on Alliance cohesion. Kissinger stated that it would be generally disastrous, and warned that, regardless of how independent these parties may be from the control of the Kremlin, they can be expected to demonstrate their basic Communist convictions on international issues, thereby upsetting the whole matter of foreign policy. Such may have been true prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but that major event caused outcries from some West European Communist Parties, especially the Italian Communist Party. Kissinger further noted that the strong role played by the U.S. allies in defending Western interests throughout the world could not be expected from a nation where Communists share in governmental power.

Third, the military strength of NATO and the unity of the Alliance would be gravely weakened. Kissinger believes that it is merely "lip service" that the West European

Communist Parties pay to NATO. If Communists were to share power, he continues, it is hard to imagine how the present NATO structure could continue, with its integrated military planning, political consultation and exchange of highly classified material if Communists had a major share of power in a member's government.

Finally, the progress toward European unity may be undermined, as may be the solidarity of the Alliance. From an initial position of opposition toward the European Common Market, the PCI and the PCF have come to accept the European Community as a fact of life. Kissinger states that the West European Communists would tend to reorient the Common Market towards closer relations with the state economies of Eastern Europe and toward the more extreme of the Third World's demands for a "new international economic order."⁶ The assumption can be made, according to the former Secretary of State, that they will not encourage European political unity to stimulate cooperation with the U.S.; instead they will urge it toward Third World tendencies. Over time, the governments with Communists sharing power will pull the others towards them or deep fissures within the European Community will result, separating the "traditional Atlanticists" and the "New Left."⁷

Kissinger, his hard-line attitude toward Communism and his gloomy prognosis for Western Europe have come under attack by writers who differ with his views. A representative

example is the rebuttal of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., writing in Current. In countering the main issues raised by the former Secretary, Mr. Schlesinger disputes the theory that Communist participation in working democratic governments would destroy the "moral base" of the NATO Alliance. While Kissinger was in office, he argues, that "moral base" - civil freedom and government by consent - had to endure and to survive not authoritarian elements in democratic governments but actual dictatorships, as was the case in Greece and Portugal.⁸

Schlesinger goes on to dispute the Kissinger prognosis for Western Europe: "Communist participation leading to Communist domination, the dissolution of NATO, the end of Atlantic unity, the extension of Soviet control to the English Channel and a massive upset in the global power balance."⁹ If such were the case, then the best remedy would be the sternest of actions against the West European Communists. However, Schlesinger continues with criticism of Kissinger's solution to the problem. While Kissinger concluded that the United States must refrain from doing anything that could lend legitimacy to Eurocommunism and offered no stronger recommendations, Schlesinger claims that the disproportion between diagnosis and cure appears futile as well as unrealistic.¹⁰

On the subject of exchange of classified NATO information, Ciro Zoppo presents an interesting argument that dispels the Kissinger notion on the danger of the issue. Zoppo

notes that the most disruptive threat to NATO cohesion has been possible PCI access to "NATO secrets." While such may be the case, he argues that it does not follow that the PCI would engage in military espionage for the Soviet Union merely because they are Communists. He further points out that PCI participation in government is not synonymous with a takeover of the government. The party leaders have made it known that they do not seek either the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior, nor will they be given such posts.¹¹

Of paramount importance is the fact that the PCI does not and, as far as can be seen, will not have political aspirations that would justify its taking the risks involved in passing NATO military secrets to Soviet intelligence. Such acts of espionage, if discovered, could have extremely serious consequences for the PCI's political future. Zoppo summarizes his argument by noting that the problem of NATO secrets and the PCI may be more psychological and political than operational.¹²

As an indirect reinforcement to Kissinger's statements, the results of a NATO study conducted in early 1978 show that serious attention must be given to the Italian situation. Reported in The New York Times,¹³ the study highlights various NATO-related actions which would either be implemented immediately or would be strongly recommended if the PCI were to control the government.

The military consequences of any Italian withdrawal from the Alliance were addressed, also. Among the reactions noted was the immediate cutoff of information provided Italy on strategic and tactical nuclear targets in Eastern Europe. Next was the curtailment of information on U.S., British and French nuclear planning and weapons production, along with ousting of Italy from participation in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). An alternative to expulsion from the NPG is the possibility of a "gentleman's agreement" whereby the Italian representatives to NATO would excuse themselves voluntarily from such a sensitive forum.

As a result of the nuclear weapons deployed in the country, the Italian government maintains an input into NATO's nuclear planning. Specifically, there are three batteries of nuclear-tipped Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missiles located around Padua. In addition, northern Italy holds F-104 fighter bombers with nuclear bombs and a missile brigade equipped with Lance and Pershing medium-range surface-to-surface missiles. In fact, the U.S. has extensive nuclear warheads in storage in Italy, both for its own use and as a NATO reserve.¹⁴

The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) system is essential to Italy's own security and also integrates Italy's radar, military communications and weapons systems with those of the other NATO nations. While NATO would probably want to keep NADGE intact under future Italian governments, the Italians, under a Communist coalition government, could

withdraw from this defense project concerned with early warning of and response to hostile aircraft and missiles.¹⁵

Another contingency noted in the NATO study is the transfer of the headquarters of AFSOUTH from Naples to another allied country. Communist entry into the government could also force a review of the deployment of the Sixth Fleet and other NATO naval forces operating in Italian waters. Naval authorities speculate that the movement of warships and replenishment vessels supporting the Sixth Fleet is presently being reported to the Communists by their agents. With Communists in the government, they would have access to prior information on such movements, thereby possibly reducing the effectiveness of NATO naval deployments in the Mediterranean. However, as noted previously in Zoppo's work, the probability of such espionage acts appears remote due to the penalties if exposed.

The study reported "the worst possible case" as that in which the 11,000 military personnel of the U.S. stationed in Italy would have to be withdrawn, and naval operations shifted to the western basin of the Mediterranean.¹⁶

In response to the question, "will Communist participation in the government...of Italy weaken NATO?" Godson and Haseler offer various thought-provoking answers.¹⁷ If Italy was to withdraw from the Alliance, most likely under Communist promptings, NATO would become basically a "North American/North European defense pact," relying primarily

upon a U.S./West German accord. As former Secretary Kissinger noted, "This specter could then be used in other West European countries to undermine what remains of Atlantic cohesion."¹⁸ Of equal importance would be the psychological shock to the Alliance. NATO would appear to be gravely weakened and anti-Soviet intentions would deteriorate. With this climate of gloom over the Alliance, the other NATO nations, including West Germany, could be easily swayed into seeking separate deals with the Soviet Union as a means of limiting the blow to their security.¹⁹

A more realistic assumption of what might occur would be that, upon entering the government, the Italian Communists would not insist upon a withdrawal from NATO. In fact, as noted earlier, General Secretary Berlinguer has stated clearly that he does not propose a unilateral withdrawal of Italy from the Atlantic Alliance. Rather the Italian Communists have strong feelings regarding the reforming of the existing organization. Notwithstanding this fact, the PCI in government could pose security problems for the Alliance and could possibly propose reductions in defense expenditures. On the latter issue, the pressure which the United States could exert upon Italy and its Communist government to retain its defense spending level would be minimal.²⁰

A profound precedent would be set if the PCI rose to power in a future Italian government. For the first time, NATO would have within its council a member nation whose

professed aim and ambition is "the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the removal of all foreign bases from European soil, and the resolution of conflict by an all-European security conference."²¹ According to Godson and Haseler, the political unity of the Alliance will suffer with divisions between the European member nations over these European policy questions.

This type of disparity among the NATO countries would lead to a misunderstanding on the part of Americans as to why the United States should support, in a defense pact, one Communist nation against other Communist nations. Confusion would result which would lead to a reduction of American resolve and a possible isolation based upon an American disenchantment with European politics. The U.S. would be more inclined to support "a truncated NATO" rather than one in which Communist governments participate. According to Godson and Haseler,

...the entry of Communists into NATO governments would make more likely a potentially fatal double fracture of the Alliance: the first between the northern and southern members, the second between Western Europe and the United States.²²

What would result from such fissiparous inclinations within NATO would be a devastating destabilization of the entire international system. A threat to peace would be unavoidable. If the United States were to carry its disaffection with Europe to the point of troop withdrawals or other acts of reduced American commitment, a power vacuum would be

created. While historically cautious in action, the Soviet Union could be drawn into this vacuum. Another option could be the establishment of a West European defense program by the remaining non-Communist nations of NATO. However, there would be little doubt that such action would be interpreted by the Soviet Union as provocative.²³

The importance to NATO of Italy's strategic geographical location in the Mediterranean has been addressed previously. From a military point of view, Admiral Horacio Rivero, USN, Retired, presented a startling picture of probable consequences to the Alliance of Communist domination of the Italian government. At a conference on the political stability of Italy, Admiral Rivero proclaimed

He who controls Italy controls the Mediterranean...Control of the Mediterranean means the ability to use the sea and the air above it in war. The bases in Italy and the Italian naval and air forces are needed for an effective defense of the Mediterranean against the surface and submarine threats that now exist.²⁴

The PCI in a position of power would result in an effective neutralization of Italy, according to Admiral Rivero. What follows would be the eviction of NATO headquarters in charge of the defense of southern Europe and the ouster of the U.S. headquarters responsible for anti-submarine and submarine operations. The Admiral carries his analysis a step further by declaring

The early collapse of the entire southern flank would become inevitable and even the military balance in the central region of Europe would be adversely affected by the diversion to that front of strong Warsaw Pact forces now poised against Italy.²⁵

The former Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe continues his warning with the observation that the defense of Greece and Turkey would become increasingly difficult with a neutral Italy. These NATO nations can be effectively defended only by "the introduction of massive air power" which Rivero believes can only be from the United States. Such defenses could be available only if Spain and/or France provided refuelling facilities, a "very unlikely possibility."²⁶

This military prognosis detailed by Admiral Rivero presents an alarming scenario for future NATO activity without the participation of the critically important Italy. His analysis is based upon the neutralization of Italy if the PCI participated in the government, an assumption which may not hold true. The disconcerting possibility of such an event becoming reality causes grave concern to the members of NATO and the United States policy makers. However, the picture of gloom is not a certainty by any means. NATO without the active role of Italy is only one possible alternative if the Italian Communists rise to power. Other options are noteworthy and bear mention at this time.

B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATO ALLIANCE

Dr. Eric Willenz, an executive officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for External Affairs, Department of State, shared a most interesting observation in an interview. He stated that, according to the PCI leader,

Berlinguer, "the problem in the NATO Alliance as well as the Warsaw Pact is that you cannot build the type of Socialism you want in either."²⁷ This brings to mind that, if the Communists do attain power, there may well be a definite need to consider alternatives to the NATO Alliance. To protect the security of the Alliance and to maintain the best degree of cohesion of the Pact, the members of NATO would be wise to foresee difficulties in the near future and prepare to face the possibility of Communists among their ranks and at their conference tables.

An informative report has been written by J.E. Dougherty and D.K. Pfaltzgraff in conjunction with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.²⁸ In their study, the authors discuss Eurocommunism and the policy implications for the Alliance. They have provided an in-depth analysis of the the future of NATO, and the major points of their work will be addressed here.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out that NATO has a history of suffering from internal dissension covering a wide spectrum of issues. The development of Eurocommunism and the challenges posed by it create special implications for NATO institutions. If the PCI were to enter the government, there would be a need for NATO to devise new institutional forms to cope with the inherent difficulties raised by Communists in political power. "Composed of national governments reflecting increasingly divergent domestic structures, NATO is constrained to act at the lowest common

denominator of agreement. Eurocommunism is likely to lower that common denominator for action."²⁹

The Eurocommunism issue has presented the United States with a delicate predicament. On the one hand, it would like to maintain the NATO Alliance as a valuable, effective implement for the defense of Western Europe and the United States. However, on the other hand, there is the obviously devastating effect upon Alliance cohesion and solidarity which Eurocommunism could cause. The United States recognizes this consequence and is faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to tolerate in NATO the presence of governments under Communist influence either as "full" or "partial" members.³⁰

In the context of alternatives to NATO in its present form, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff offer five different approaches which can be pursued. First, there can be the consolidation of NATO and/or U.S. facilities in the member nation. In order to present a "lower profile" in the allied country, forces can be regrouped and bases consolidated to reduce the visibility of the NATO units. Where political ramifications negatively outweigh the military utility of the bases, the United States could consider withdrawing from these particular facilities. In Italy, if the PCI decided to reduce the role of Italy in the Alliance, such palliatives would do no more than delay the dismantling of the NATO structure.

Second, withdrawal by a government under Communist influence or control could be encouraged by the other allied

nations. A key factor in this situation is the relative strength of the Italian Communist Party vis-à-vis the other political parties. Because of the power and size of the PCI, it is doubtful that its position within the government could be reversed, thus decreasing the possibility of such an alternative. Should the Italian Communists continue to consolidate their power and precipitate obstructive behavior within the Alliance, thereby posing a threat to its activities, the United States could be compelled to encourage the voluntary withdrawal of the Communist government. If such action were unfavorably received, the next step could be the expulsion from the NATO Alliance.

"Quarantine" within NATO of a government whose loyalty to the purposes of the Alliance is in doubt is a third alternative. While this option worked well in Portugal's case, it would not be applicable to Italy because of the greater involvement of the Italians in NATO's more sensitive groups, as well as the importance of the country's strategic location in the Mediterranean. Another factor is the difference in character of these two Communist parties. Boycott of Italy could cause serious political and psychological consequences to the fabric of the Alliance. It would be necessary to renegotiate the North Atlantic Treaty to provide for fuller or lesser degrees of participation within the Alliance. More problems would be created than solved by such action. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff describe it,

The classification of members in a 'multi-tier' structure would enjoy little prospect of support in the legislature of member states. Indeed, the definition of members as belonging to one category or another might present nearly insurmountable problems and hold potential for disagreement, dissatisfaction, and protracted negotiations among Alliance members.³¹

This option may sound unattractive and infeasible: however, it may be the best of those offered.

A fourth alternative open to NATO is to expel a Communist government, but not the member country, from the NATO Alliance. Considered a "damage-limiting" option, where no country would have to shoulder the burden of forcibly evicting a country from the Alliance, this method allows NATO to conduct its business as usual and prevent the passing of sensitive materials out of the Pact orbit. At the same time, this option would permit "the Alliance door" to remain open to a successor government. While isolating the Communist government, this approach affirms NATO support to the non-Communists in the country. Further, there is no provision in the North Atlantic Treaty for the expulsion of a member state from NATO. This action may prove infeasible for this reason as well as the fact that "NATO might lack the necessary consensus for such drastic surgery."³²

The fifth option presented by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff is to conclude bilateral agreements with those West European countries that are willing to provide satisfactory terms for the United States in return for a defense guarantee. In the event that the other options fail to produce the

desired effect, this method could be employed. However, the prospects of safeguarding European interests are severely diminished if all other options are unsuccessful. By exercising this fifth option, a profound fragmentation occurs, dividing the countries into three groups: (1) those still hanging on to the protective shield and power of the United States; (2) "quasi-neutral" countries which continue to have nominal ties with the U.S. but dilute the strong defense posture, becoming somewhat innocuous in their defense policies; and, (3) "neutral" countries, which would include those nations with Communists in their government.³³

In addition to the suggested alternatives for a future NATO, another can be added that resembles the final one posed by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. The "two-tier alliance," as discussed by a Department of State officer in the NATO division,³⁴ could be created when Communists entered the government. Such action could produce a schism within the Alliance. On one side would be the "true allies", and on the other side, there would be the "so-so" types who were not totally committed to the Alliance, for whatever reason. This would be the worst case because of the irrevocable damage done to the structure of NATO. The possibility of reconstructing the Alliance to some valid state would be nil.³⁵

It can be seen that the various postulated effects of Eurocommunism and Italian Communism in particular upon the

NATO Alliance range the gamut in degree of severity and consequential repercussions. While all are basically hypothetical at this stage and course in history, it is very important to have contingency plans and alternatives formulated in the event that action would be necessary, both by the members of the NATO Alliance and the United States.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The Communist Party of Italy is large, powerful and historically rooted in a country which has been a close ally of the United States for over thirty years. Italy is one of the most vital nations in the NATO Alliance, providing a strategic location in the southern flank. The Italian Communists steadily increased their electoral support from the early 1940s until 1979. Notwithstanding the setback in the 1979 elections, the PCI is active and continues to speak out on issues of concern to its membership and to all Italians. As Berlinguer noted, the country will still have to reckon with the Communists.

The United States government appreciates the sovereign nature of the nations of Western Europe and recognizes the need to develop a more flexible foreign policy toward these countries. The United States government has no misconception that it can coerce the people of Italy, by whatever means, be it economic, military or political, into voting a particular way in a national or regional election. It is the responsibility and the duty of the Italian people to choose between a Communist, non-Communist or mixed government. Therefore, there is little in the way of specific direct action that the United States can do to eliminate a Communist-dominated Italian parliament.

However, as previously noted, the United States can develop a more relaxed foreign policy toward the Communists in Italy. As such, the American government should make every effort to avoid overt and covert political intervention in Italy and the other democratic countries on the continent. The United States should avoid using economic involvement as a tactic of force and pressure, but rather as an incentive. By developing a more tolerant attitude, the United States would be in a position to use its influence in achieving certain vital tasks: the continued participation of Italy in a Western economic framework, deterrence of Soviet presence in whatever manner, preservation of free institutions and a democratic political system, and continued cooperation and participation in the NATO Alliance.¹

Another necessary change in present policy involves increased U.S. efforts to communicate with diverse political groups, especially on the non-Communist left. Overall, the United States needs to pursue a foreign policy and political role that confronts present and future realities in Western Europe.²

The American government cannot afford to be intransigent toward the Italian Communists and the political calculus in Italy. A policy of non-compromise would require the U.S. to support the most anti-Communist factions in the Christian Democratic Party. These same elements within the DC want to block reform of the current corrupt practices which

have contributed to the present crisis and to the rise in popularity of the Communists. Ultimately, the DC would become an ineffective constraint on the Communists in a coalition government and might be excluded from government, should the leftist parties acquire a sufficiently large parliamentary majority to rule with the DC.³

A second cost of intransigence is the alienation of pro-American sectors of Italian public and elite opinion. These same sectors represent the critical social support for those groups in the PSI and the DC which are capable of balancing the strength of the Communists. A third risk of intransigence toward the PCI is that it may weaken the ability of the Italian Communists to maintain their autonomy from the Soviet Union. To gain such independence from Russian authority, the Party has had to combat considerable resistance within its ranks and to initiate a massive education program to alter the members' conception of "proletarian internationalism." Were the United States unwilling to accept a role in the government for the PCI, this weakening of its autonomy could result.⁴

When asked what the United States response would be to Communist participation in the Italian government, a senior official of the Policy Planning Division of the Department of State responded by saying that there is "no real answer" or contingency plan.⁵ The American government has formulated no plan of action, according to Dr. Anton De Porte, because such a move would appear to add credence to the Communists'

drive for power and could signify that the United States has accepted the inevitability of PCI participation in government. He emphasized that it was in the U.S. interest to maintain "a decent relationship" with the Communists. Dr. De Porte did speculate that the U.S. could "shock the Italians into throwing out the PCI." Measures used to accomplish this task include the cutting back of funds and loans to Italy, making an example of the country and (while this alternative appears drastic as well as highly unlikely, as previously mentioned), the threat of expulsion of Italy from the North Atlantic Alliance.⁶

Differing Western responses were offered by a Department of State European analyst who stressed that his opinions were in no way the official policy of the Department or the Carter Administration. In his view, there are three alternatives to counter the effect to NATO of Communists in the Italian government: (1) force Italy out of the Nuclear Planning Group and cut off the flow of information to her, (2) seek a quiet agreement, and (3) conduct "business as usual." The first option is considered conspicuous and embarrassing to the Italians and could generate a retaliation from the Communist Party (i.e., the ouster of U.S./NATO military armed forces from Italy, removal of nuclear weapons from Italian territory, etc.). An alternative could prove to be difficult in that we would not be at all sure that the Italian Communists would agree quietly to stay out of sensitive areas

and meetings. The most likely option is probably the third, the "business as usual" approach.⁷

The so-called bottom line to the question of Communist participation rests with the voters of Italy. In fact, the United States could do very little if anything to influence the outcome of such a situation. This Communist challenge can be overcome with able Western leadership and cohesion. In conjunction with Lieber's theories introduced earlier, Kissinger presented possible courses of action for America. He declared that the role of the United States is vital in encouraging an attitude of resolve and conviction. The American government must recognize the problems that could ensue with the Communists in power and must understand the decision this will impose on the United States. The American leaders need to avoid the impression that we believe Communist success to be inevitable. The U.S. should refrain from association or consultation with Communist leaders. Finally, the policies of the United States toward its allies should be executed in a manner that strengthens the moderate, progressive and democratic governments of Western Europe.⁸ While these proclamations of Kissinger's may seem overly cautious to many observers and analysts, it is important to be realistic as well as prepared.

If a specific policy were to be defined by the United States regarding this issue of Eurocommunism and the American response to Communists in NATO governments, the following would be advisable:

1. to avoid pronouncements that exaggerate or magnify the problem and do not help the Europeans to deal with it on their own terms,
2. to avoid ideological rigidity and have a clear understanding of what is happening in Europe, in order to be able to encourage and assist democratic forces - conservative, center, or socialist - to meet economic and social problems within the framework of free institutions.
3. to fulfill, with our allies, the requirements of Western defense, adapting the NATO structure to new political situations as we have in the past, and
4. to take advantage of what détente has done and can do in opening the East to ideas of the West.⁹

These points are especially significant in this time of turbulence in the international scene. The United States is caught in a situation in Iran which is like no event in the recent past. The most troublesome aspect is that there is no immediate solution to the predicament involving the American hostages. Further to the east, the dramatic action of the Soviet Union last December in its invasion of Afghanistan has provoked outcry and upheaval in all parts of the world. Of real significance was the strong condemnation of the Russians by the Italian Communist Party. Berlinguer and his party have voiced opposition to this event in harsh terms, calling the intervention a violation of the principles of independence and sovereignty. This criticism of the Soviet Union was shared by the Spanish Communist Party as well, but the event seemed to split the French Communist Party from the other two. Marchais and his French colleagues

faithfully repeated every one of the Soviet lies about Afghanistan. During Marchais' visit to the Soviet Union, he was given virtually the honors of a state visitor and was twice received by Brezhnev at well-publicized meetings.¹⁰ Such action would never have been carried out by the Italian Communist leader, who deplored this recent Soviet act of aggression.

As this is written, the situation in Yugoslavia is an extremely precarious one with the Yugoslav leader, Josip Bronz Tito on his death bed. Long a friend of Berlinguer and the Italian Communists, President Tito and his independent-minded form of Communism in his country have acted as a buffer for the Italians against the Soviets. If the Soviet Union were to move into the country after the passing of Tito, the Italians would react immediately. As Jiri Valenta notes, such a move on the part of the Russians would certainly cement the unity of the Eurocommunists against the Soviet Union.¹¹

With all these events as considerations in the overall picture, a question remains regarding the Alliance and the possible Communist participation in the Italian government. "What will the rise of the Italian Communists to power portend for the NATO Alliance and the United States?" A number of possible answers to that query have been presented in this study. Individually, they do not prove as effective as the combination. There will be repercussions in NATO

with Communists in cabinet-level posts. The PCI has repeatedly stated that it is neither interested in nor desires to hold the portfolios of the Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs or Interior Minister. But, the difficulty of evaluating these proclamations, as well as the phenomenon of Eurocommunism, is that it has not been tested. While the PCI leadership may say today that it does not desire those key posts which are most sensitive and that they would leave office if voted out by the people, who can predict but that tomorrow may prove to be a different story?

The author does not espouse the school of thought advanced by Henry Kissinger, who approached the subject as a major catastrophe with no solution but a devastating one to the national security of the United States and the Alliance. Likewise, the subject cannot be treated casually and with frivolity because it had never occurred; hence the Communists cannot expect to ever hold cabinet positions or control the government of Italy. This is a casual approach to a potentially serious matter. Although the initiation of contingency plans could relay an inaccurate message to our allies, it is necessary to plan for the worst and be prepared for the events if they should occur. While the Italian Communist Party is presently not at the summit in popularity that it enjoyed in the summer of 1976, one cannot rule out the possibility that the people of Italy may seek the assistance of the Communists to return the country to economic and political equilibrium.

The United States government would be unhappy to see the participation in government of an Italian Communist Party that favored the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nor would it want to see a totalitarian government in Italy. However, the Italian political process must work for itself with possible advice from other European nations interacting with Italy. The issue is an open one and any ultimate decision on the outcome of the political environment of Italy will be made by the Italian electorate.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY STATISTICS OF ITALY

Population: 57,200,000

Military service: Army and Air Force 12 months

Navy 18 months

Total armed forces: 365,000 (226,000 conscripts)

Estimated GNP 1978: \$259 billion

Defense expenditure 1979: \$6.11 billion

ARMY: 254,000 (180,000 conscripts)

3 corps headquarters

1 armored division (of 1 armored, 2 mechanical brigades)

3 mechanical divisions (each of 1 armored, 1 mechanical brigade)

1 independent mechanical brigade

5 independent motorized brigades

5 alpine brigades

1 airborne brigade

2 amphibious battalions

1 missile brigade with 1 Lance SSM, 4 HAWK SAM battalions

620 M-47, 300 M-60A1, 730 Leopard med tanks; 4,000 M-106,

M-113, M-548, M-577 APC; 1,500 guns/how, including

334 105 mm pack, 155 mm, 203 mm; 100 M-44, 200 M-109

155mm, 36 M-107 175 mm, 150 M-55 203mm SP guns/how;

81 mm, 107 mm 120 mm mor; 6 Lance SSM; 57 mm, 106

mm RCL; Mosquito, Cobra, SS-11, TOW ATGW; 220 40mm

AA guns; 22 Improved HAWK SAM.

(On order: 100 Leopard tanks, 500 M-113 APC, 160 FH-70

towed, SP-70, M-109 SP 155mm how, TOW ATGW, CL-89

drones)

ARMY AVIATION: 20 units with 40 O-1E, 39 L-21, 80 SM-1019

light aircraft; helo incl 70 AB-47G/J, 36

AB-204B, 98 AB-205A, 140 AB-206A/A-1, 25

CH-47C, 5 A-109.

(On order: 60 A-129, 1 CH-47C helo)

RESERVES: 550,000

NAVY: 42,000, including 1,500 air arm, 1,000 Marines and

23,000 conscripts

9 submarines (1 Sauro, 4 Toti, 2 ex-Tang, 2 ex-U.S. Guppy III)

1 Vittorio Veneto helo cruiser with 9 AB-204B/AB-212 ASW helo, Terrier/ASROC missiles

2 Andrea Doria cruisers with 4 ASW helo, Terrier SAM

4 GW destroyers (2 Audace with 2 ASW helo, Tartar SAM;

2 Impavido with Tartar)

3 destroyers (1 San Giorgio (trg), 2 Impetuoso)
 12 frigates (2 Lupo with Otomat SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM,
 1 ASW helo; 2 Alpino with 2 helo; 4 Bergamini with
 1 helo; 4 Centauro)
 8 corvettes (4 De Cristofaro, 4 Albatros)
 1 Sparviero hydrofoil with Otomat SSM
 4 FAC(G/T): 2 Freccia (1 with Sea Killer SSM), 2 Lampo
 4 ex-U.S. Agile ocean, 13 ex-U.S. Adjutant and 17 Agave
 coastal 8 Aragosta inshore minesweepers
 2 ex-U.S. De Soto County LST, 19 ex-U.S. LCM
 2 Stromboli replenishment tankers
 1 Marine infantry battalion with M-113A1, LVTP-7 APC,
 81mm mor, 106mm RCL
 (On order: 3 Sauro subs, 1 helo carrier, 6 Maestrale,
 2 Lupo frigates, 6 SSM hydrofoils, 4 minehunters)

NAVAL AIR ARM: 5 ASW helo squadrons with 24 SH-3D, 24
 AB-204AS, 20 AB-212
 (On order: 35 AB-212, 6 SH-3D)

RESERVES: 160,000

AIR FORCE: 69,000 (23,000 conscripts); 311 combat aircraft
 6 FGA squadrons: 1 with 18 F-104G, 3 with 54
 F-104S/G, 2 with 36 G-91Y
 3 light attack/recce squadrons with 54 G-91R/R1/R1A
 6 AWW squadrons with 72 F-104S
 2 recce squadrons with 36 F/RF-104G
 2 MR squadrons with 18 Atlantic
 1 ECM/recce squadron with 6 PD-808, 2 EC-119G,
 EC-47
 3 tpt squadrons: 2 with 20 G-222, 1 with 10
 C-130H
 4 comms squadrons with 26 P-166M, 32 SIAI-208M,
 8 PD-808, 2 DC-9, 1 DC-6; 2 HD-3D, 20 AB-47 helo
 4 SAR squadrons with 8 HU-16 aircraft; 24 AB-204,
 14 HH-3F helo
 1 OCU with 15 TF-104G
 6 trg squadrons with 70 G-91T, 100 MB-326/-339,
 14 P-166M, 20 SF-260M aircraft; 35 AB-47J, 5
 AB-204B helo
 AIM-7E Sparrow, Sidewinder AAM
 8 SAM groups with 96 Nike Hercules
 (On order: 100 Tornado MRCA, 100 MB-339 trg, 24
 G-222 typts)


RESERVES: 28,000

SOURCE: The Military Balance 1979-1980

APPENDIX B

THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN



SOURCE: Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).

APPENDIX D

PARTIAL LISTING OF U.S./NATO INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY

| <u>COMMAND</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Allied Forces Southern Europe | Naples |
| Allied Land Forces Southern Europe | Verona |
| Allied Air Forces Southern Europe | Naples |
| Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe | Naples |
| Naval Striking and Support Forces | Naples |
| NATO Defense College | Rome |
| AWS Research Center (SACLANT) | La Spezia |
| Aviano Air Base | Rovereto (Aviano) |
| Camp Darby | Leghorn (Livorno) |
| COMASWFORSIXTHFLT | Naples |
| COMFAIRMED | Naples |
| COMSERVFOR, SIXTH FLEET | Naples |
| COMSIXTHFLT | Gaeta |
| COMSUBREFITRAGRU | La Maddalena |
| Naval Air Facility, Naples | Naples |
| Naval Air Facility, Sigonella | Sigonella |
| NAVCOMMSTA, Italy | Naples |
| NAVSECGRUACT, San Vito | San Vito |
| NAVSUPPACT, Naples | Naples |
| PATRON | Sigonella |
| USAF Senior Rep. | Naples |
| 8th Log. Comd, Camp Darby | Leghorn |
| 40th Tac Gp | Aviano |
| 2187th Comm Gp | Aviano |
| USN Support Office | La Maddalena |
| Marine Barracks | Naples |

SOURCE: Department of Defense Autovon Telephone Directory
(on advice of Italian Liaison Officer, Pentagon, Washington,
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
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